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END OF THE DIALOGUE?  
POLITICAL POLARIZATION, THE 
SUPREME COURT, AND CONGRESS 
RICHARD L. HASEN* 
INTRODUCTION 
On the last of three historic days of oral argument considering the 
constitutionality of the Obama Administration’s health care law, the 
Justices of the United States Supreme Court turned to the question of 
severability: if the Court struck down one or more major components of the 
law, should the entire, over 900-page law1 fall as well, or should the Court 
sever the unconstitutional parts and preserve the rest of it? One of the 
lawyers arguing in favor of severability contended that even if the Court 
struck down the heart of the law, “yes, Congress would have wanted”2 
other provisions kept intact, such as those giving new benefits for victims 
of black lung disease. In response, Justice Kennedy asked: “the real 
Congress or a hypothetical Congress?”3 The audience laughed.4 
Justice Kennedy’s response was funny, but the issue was serious. The 
Justices were well aware that the health care law barely passed on a party-
line vote, thanks to some arm-twisting by the Democratic Obama 
 
 * Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, University of California, Irvine School 
of Law. Thanks to Sam Bagenstos, Jeb Barnes, Larry Baum, Jim Brudey, Erwin Chemerinsky, Neal 
Devins, Bill Eskridge, Beth Garrett, Hal Krent, Sarah Lawsky, Marty Lederman, Sandy Levinson, 
David Mayhew, Rick Pildes, Michael Solimine, Michael Waterstone, Timothy Zick, and participants at 
a William & Mary Law School workshop for useful comments and suggestions, Keith Poole and Chris 
Hare for their help with Voteview.com data and figures, James Buatti for excellent and tireless research 
assistance, and Ellen Augustiniak, Dianna Sahhar, and Christina Tsou for wonderful library assistance. 
 1. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2675 (2012) (“The ACA is over 900 
pages long.”) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, J.J., dissenting). 
 2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 72, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 2012 U.S. Trans. 
LEXIS 28 (2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-400). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. (noting audience laughter). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2130190
HASE7 1/25/2013  12:30 PM 
102 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:--- 
administration, unusual procedural maneuverings between the House and 
Senate, and side deals to bring along wary moderate Democrats.5 At oral 
argument Justice Scalia referred to the so-called “Cornhusker kickback,” a 
sweetheart deal for Nebraska which was at one point inserted in the law 
(and later removed) to ensure Nebraska Senator Ben Nelson’s vote.6 
Partisan acrimony over the health care law only intensified when 
Republicans took back control of the House and Democrats lost their brief, 
sixty-vote filibuster-proof majority in the Senate. Republicans vowed to 
overturn what they called “Obamacare,” and they took over thirty votes in 
the House to do just that, with their efforts predictably never picked up by 
the majority Democratic Senate.7 The partisan divide was national, with 
twenty-six states—all led by Republicans—filing a brief with the Supreme 
Court opposing the constitutionality of the health care law.8 
By the time of the oral argument, the Justices knew that the Court’s 
decision on which provisions of the health care law remained valid would 
likely be the final word. This was due to the United States Senate’s rules, 
which require sixty votes to make changes to most laws, and the fact that 
partisan polarization and a closely-divided Senate meant that neither party 
had sixty votes to alter the status quo. In response to the lawyer’s plea for 
severability at oral argument, Justice Scalia responded:  
 You can’t repeal the rest of the Act because you’re not going to get 60 
votes in the Senate to repeal the rest. It’s not a matter of enacting a new 
 
 5. David M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Final Votes in Congress Cap Battle on Health Bill, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2010, at A17, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/health/policy/26health.html; Robert Pear & David M. 
Herszenhorn, Obama Hails Vote on Health Care as Answering ‘the Call of History,’ N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
22, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/22/health/policy/22health.html; Josh 
Gerstein, Pork Greased Reform’s Passage, POLITICO (Dec. 22, 2009), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1209/30877.html.  
 6. Olivier Knox, Scalia Mocks Health Care Law ‘Cornhusker Kickback’ Provision—That No 
Longer Exists, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 28, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/ticket/scalia-mocks-
health-care-law-cornhusker-kickback-provision-205148292.html. Nelson voted against the health care 
law. Herszenhorn & Pear, supra note 5. 
 7. Robert Pear, Repeal of Health Care Law Approved, Again, by House, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 
2012, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/health/policy/house-votes-again-to-
repeal-health-law.html. 
 8. Linda Greenhouse, Never Before, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Mar. 21, 2012, 9:00 PM), 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/21/never-before/ (“Republican officeholders in all 26 
states joined together in the case now known as United States Department of Health and Human 
Services v. State of Florida. In 22 of those states, the officeholder was the attorney general. In four 
states with Democratic attorneys general (Nevada, Wyoming, Iowa and Mississippi), Republican 
governors filed in their own names.”). 
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act. You’ve got to get 60 votes to repeal it. So [if the Court severs the 
unconstitutional parts] the rest of the Act is going to be the law.9 
The Court’s recognition of the political reality at oral argument was 
not matched in the 193 pages of opinions in the case. The Justices’ analysis 
of the health care law gave no inkling of the intense partisan atmosphere 
surrounding the law or the legal challenge. When the Justices stated their 
varying opinions on severability,10 none mentioned the fact that the Court’s 
word was likely to be final because of partisan deadlock, even as four 
dissenters said that the rest of the law was not severable and it all needed to 
fall. That is not to say that the issue of congressional polarization was out 
of the Justices’ thoughts as they wrote their opinions. Instead, legal 
doctrine had not expressly recognized the defining feature of modern 
American politics: deep political polarization along party lines. 
Nor did the Justices expressly acknowledge that their own decision in 
the health care case would play into partisan politics and the upcoming 
presidential election. Partisan realignment hit Congress a long time ago, as 
Southern Democrats abandoned the Democratic Party and liberal 
Republicans lost their elections, moved to the right, or retired, to the point 
that the most liberal Republican in Congress today is more conservative 
than the most conservative Democrat. But the partisan realignment of the 
Supreme Court is much more recent. It occurred only in 2011, when 
liberal/moderate Republican-nominated Justice John Paul Stevens retired, 
replaced by liberal Democrat-nominated Elena Kagan. The Court now has 
five conservative Justices who are all Republicans, and four liberal Justices 
who are all Democrats.11 
A 5-4 party split in the health care case threatened the legitimacy of 
the Supreme Court, which had already begun to see an unprecedented 
decline in popularity among the public.12 Chief Justice Roberts’ surprise 
decision to vote with the four liberal Democrats to uphold the health care 
law startled Republicans and was viewed as a major victory for President 
 
 9. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 2, at 67. Some have suggested that had Republicans 
retaken control of the Senate, they could have tried to use the “reconciliation” process to repeal the 
health care law. Reconciliation bills are not subject to a Senate filibuster. For the difficulties 
Republicans would face in overturning the health care law even using reconciliation, see Ryan Lizza, 
Why Romney Won’t Repeal Obamacare, THE NEW YORKER NEWS DESK (June 28, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/06/why-romney-wont-repeal-obamacare.html. 
 10. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607–08 (2012); id. at 2668–77 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, J.J., dissenting). 
 11. See infra Part III.A. I refer to the Justices as “Democrats” or “Republicans” to indicate which 
party nominated that Justice.  
 12. See infra Part III.B. 
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Obama’s reelection chances.13 Roberts’ popularity among Republicans 
unsurprisingly declined sharply following the health care decision,14 but 
likely would rise again if he voted, as expected, to strike down affirmative 
action in education, to strike down parts of the Voting Rights Act, and to 
uphold new abortion restrictions. The effect of future partisan-divided 
Supreme Court decisions on public opinion remains uncertain. 
This Article considers the likely effects of continued political 
polarization on the relative power of Congress and the Supreme Court.15 
Polarization is already leading to an increase in the power of the Court 
against Congress, whether or not the Justices affirmatively seek that 
additional power. The governing model of congressional-Supreme Court 
relations is that the branches are in dialogue on statutory interpretation: 
Congress writes federal statutes, the Court interprets them, and Congress 
has the power to overrule the Court’s interpretations. The Court’s 
interpretive rules are premised upon this dialogic model, such as the rule 
that Supreme Court statutory interpretation precedents are subject to “super 
strong” stare decisis protection because Congress can always correct an 
errant court interpretation. Legislation scholars also write as though 
congressional overriding remains common.16 
 
 13. Jim Malone, Analysts: Supreme Court Health Care Ruling Helps Obama, VOICE OF 
AMERICA (June 28, 2012), http://www.voanews.com/content/analysts-say-supreme-court-health-care-
ruling-helps-obama/1349054.html. 
 14. Kevin Robillard, Poll: GOP Down on John Roberts, Dems Up, POLITICO (July 16, 2012), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/78562.html. 
 15. The presidency’s strength against Congress also has been growing as a result of political 
polarization, which has provided an opening for unilateral presidential action on both domestic and 
foreign affairs. See Matthew N. Beckmann & Anthony J. McGann, Navigating the Legislative Divide: 
Polarization, Presidents, and Policymaking in the United States, 20 J. THEORETICAL POL. 201, 201–02 
(2008); Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why Today’s Congress 
Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 395, 396–97 
(2009); Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the 
Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 491–96 (2008); Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. 
Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2342–47 (2006); Jide Nzelibe, 
Partisan Conflicts Over Presidential Authority, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 389, 392–95 (2011). 
Although the Bush presidency was known for its “unitary executive” theory and assertions of executive 
power, President Obama also has taken some notable steps to assert unilateral power, such as his recent 
executive order which will allow “[h]undreds of thousands of illegal immigrants who came to the 
United States as children [to] be allowed to remain in the country without fear of deportation and able 
to work.” Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in U.S., 
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/us/us-to-stop-
deporting-some-illegal-immigrants.html?hp. He took this step following the inability of Congress to 
pass legislation accomplishing similar ends. The Supreme Court’s decisions on executive power also 
affect congressional-presidential relations. These important developments are beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 16. See infra Part I.B. 
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In fact, in the last two decades the rate of Congressional overriding of 
Supreme Court statutory decisions has plummeted dramatically, from an 
average of twelve overrides of Supreme Court cases in each two-year 
Congressional term during the 1975–1990 period, to an average of 5.8 
overrides for each term from 1991 to 2000, and to a mere 2.8 average 
number of overrides for each term from 2001 to 2012.17 Although some of 
the decline seems attributable to the lower volume of Supreme Court 
statutory interpretation decisions, the decline in overrides greatly outpaces 
this decline in cases. Moreover, the decline does not appear driven by a 
decline in the amount of overall legislation. Instead, partisanship seems to 
have strongly diminished the opportunities for bipartisan overrides of 
Supreme Court cases, in which Democrats and Republicans come together 
to reverse the Supreme Court.18 
In its place we see a new, but rarer, phenomenon, partisan overriding, 
which appears to require conditions of near-unified control of both 
branches of Congress and the presidency. Two recent examples are: 1) the 
Military Commissions Act of 2006,19 in which Republicans overturned the 
Court’s statutory interpretation decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld20 on the 
habeas corpus rights of enemy combatants, and 2) the Lilly Ledbetter Fair 
Pay Act of 2009,21 in which Democrats overturned the Court’s statutory 
interpretation decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company22 
on how to measure the statute of limitations period in certain employment 
discrimination lawsuits. In a highly polarized atmosphere and with Senate 
rules usually requiring sixty votes to change the status quo, the Court’s 
word on the meaning of statutes is now final almost as often as its word on 
constitutional interpretation. 
Although political polarization has benefitted the Supreme Court’s 
power relative to Congress in the short term, the longer term power 
relations are more uncertain. Aside from the statutory interpretation 
dialogue, Congress interacts with the Supreme Court in other ways, 
including through Senate confirmation of Supreme Court judicial 
nominees. The recent partisan realignment of the Supreme Court makes it 
more likely that a Supreme Court judicial nominee will be filibustered in 
the Senate, thanks to the increasing willingness of senators to oppose 
 
 17. See infra Part I.B. 
 18. See infra Part I.C. 
 19. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
 20. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 21. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). 
 22. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). 
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nominees on ideological grounds and increased partisan polarization in the 
Senate. The number of senators from the opposing party of the nominating 
president voting against Supreme Court nominees is approaching or 
exceeding the filibuster level. Depending upon how the politics play out in 
a possible filibuster of a Supreme Court judicial nominee, we may see 
either an erosion of the use of the filibuster in the Senate or a compromise 
which would weaken the power of the judiciary, such as term limits 
imposed upon future Supreme Court Justices.23 
Part I of this Article demonstrates that despite the model of Congress-
Court dialogue, and Supreme Court statutory interpretation tools premised 
on that dialogue, congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory 
interpretation precedents have become exceedingly rare. The effect of this 
change is to empower the Court over Congress. Part II argues that the steep 
decline in overrides over the last two decades appears to be due in large 
part to increased polarization in Congress and not simply to a decline in the 
number of Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases. When Congress 
does override a Supreme Court case, it is now more likely to be a partisan 
override, pushed through in periods of unified government. Part III is more 
speculative, and considers a different aspect of the role political 
polarization plays in the relationship between Congress and the Supreme 
Court. It considers how polarization in Congress and the partisan 
realignment of the Supreme Court—a Court in which all the conservative 
Justices are Republicans and all the liberal Justices are Democrats—may 
eventually lead to a major confrontation in Congress over the power of the 
Senate filibuster. That confrontation may leave the Senate, the Supreme 
Court, or both, looking very different than they are today. Furthermore, 
partisan realignment has the potential to harm the Supreme Court’s 
legitimacy in a way which we have not witnessed in modern times. 
I.  THE DECLINE IN CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDES OF SUPREME 
COURT STATUTORY DECISIONS 
A.  THE DIALOGIC MODEL IN THEORY 
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to pass 
federal legislation (upon the president’s agreement or an overriding of a 
veto24) and the judiciary the power to review cases arising under these 
 
 23. See infra Part III. 
 24. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7. 
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“Laws of the United States.”25 The Supreme Court (or a lower court) 
sometimes strikes down a federal statute as unconstitutional. In response, 
members of Congress occasionally introduce constitutional amendments to 
overturn these rulings, and congressional committees hold hearings on 
proposed constitutional amendments. For example, Congress has 
considered overturning the Supreme Court’s ruling that flag-burning 
constitutes speech protected by the First Amendment26 and overturning the 
Court’s recent ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission27 
affording business corporations the right to spend their general treasury 
funds on candidate election campaigns.28 But the very difficult 
supermajority requirements for a constitutional amendment—two-thirds of 
Congress and three-quarters of state legislatures must agree—usually 
leaves the Court’s constitutional decisions standing. 
In contrast to judicial pronouncements about the constitutionality of 
federal statutes, which can be overridden solely through the arduous 
constitutional amendment process, Congress has the power to override a 
judicial interpretation of a federal statute simply by passing a new or 
amended statute under the normal rules for passing legislation.29 
The Supreme Court has premised its rules for interpreting federal 
statutes on this dialogic model in which Congress may correct the Supreme 
Court’s errors of statutory interpretation.30 Most importantly, the Court 
applies what William Eskridge has called a “super-strong presumption” of 
 
 25. Id., art. III, § 2. 
 26. Mike Allen, House Passes Constitutional Amendment to Ban Flag Burning, WASH. POST, 
June 23, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/06/22/AR2005062202155.html. 
 27. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 28. Warren Richey, Constitutional Amendment Required to Undo Citizens United, Senate Panel 
Told, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 24, 2012, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2012/0724/Constitutional-amendment-required-to-undo-
Citizens-United-Senate-panel-told. 
 29. I am using the definition of “override” set forth in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding 
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 332 n.1 (1991) (“A 
congressional ‘override’ includes a statute that: (1) completely overrules the holding of a statutory 
interpretation decision, just as a subsequent Court would overrule an unsatisfactory precedent; 
(2) modifies the result of a decision in some material way, such that the same case would have been 
decided differently; or (3) modifies the consequences of the decision, such that the same case would 
have been decided in the same way but subsequent cases would be decided differently. . . . ‘[O]verride’ 
[does not] include statutes for which the legislative history—mainly committee reports and hearings—
does not reveal a legislative focus on judicial decisions.”). 
 30. For a detailed and critical look at these canons, see Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, 
The Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425, 
428–33 (1992). 
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stare decisis for statutory rulings.31 The leading application, Flood v. 
Kuhn,32 involved the Supreme Court’s failure to overturn earlier precedents 
which had concluded that professional baseball was exempt from federal 
antitrust laws. In the years after the Court had initially held that baseball 
was entitled to an exception, the Court then inconsistently held that 
professional boxing and professional football were not entitled to such an 
exemption. In Flood, the Court reaffirmed its earlier inconsistent precedent 
giving baseball the exemption even though “[i]t appears that every member 
of the Court thought that [the earlier precedent] was wrongly decided.”33 
Justice Blackmun, for the Court, wrote that “[i]f there is any inconsistency 
or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency and illogic of long standing that 
is to be remedied by the Congress and not by this Court.”34 
Other Court statutory interpretation doctrines also presume the ability 
of Congress to correct an errant statutory precedent. The Court has justified 
literal-if-illogical applications of congressional statutes on grounds that 
Congress can fix any drafting problems in response to the Court’s 
decision.35 As the Court wrote in Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., a 
case allowing for an exceedingly large penalty under federal maritime law, 
“The remedy for any dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies 
with Congress and not with this Court. Congress may amend the statute; we 
may not.”36 
Three statutory construction rules related to legislative inaction, 
sometimes applied by the Court, also presume Congress’s ability to 
override mistaken court interpretations of federal statutes. Under the 
acquiescence rule, “[i]f Congress is aware of an authoritative agency or 
judicial interpretation of a statute and doesn’t amend the statute, the Court 
has sometimes presumed that Congress has ‘acquiesced’ in the 
interpretation’s correctness.”37 Under the reenactment rule, “[i]f Congress 
reenacts a statute without making any material changes in its wording, the 
Court will often presume that Congress intends to incorporate authoritative 
agency and judicial interpretations of that language into the reenacted 
 
 31. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1366 (1988). 
 32. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
 33. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 640 (4th ed. 2007). 
 34. Flood, 407 U.S. at 284. 
 35. Deborah A. Widiss, Shadow Precedents and the Separation of Powers: Statutory 
Interpretation of Congressional Overrides, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 511, 520 & n.32 (2009). 
 36. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576 (1982). 
 37. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 33, at 1048. 
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statute.”38 For example, in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,39 the Court 
noted that in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Congress overrode a number of 
the Court’s statutory interpretation decisions regarding Title VII hostile 
work environment claims but Congress did not override the Court’s earlier 
decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson.40 The Court therefore 
concluded that its earlier interpretation in Meritor was sound.41 Under the 
rejected proposal rule, “[i]f Congress (in conference committee) or one 
chamber (on the floor) considers and rejects specific statutory language, the 
Court has often been reluctant to interpret the statute along lines of the 
rejected language.”42 
Finally, in explaining application of the severability test for federal 
legislation, the dissenting Justices in the recent health care case premised 
their arguments for striking down the whole statute (and not severing the 
unconstitutional parts) on the ability of Congress to restore any parts of the 
law worthy of restoration:  
The Judiciary, if it orders uncritical severance, then assumes the 
legislative function; for it imposes on the Nation, by the Court’s decree, 
its own new statutory regime, consisting of policies, risks, and duties that 
Congress did not enact. That can be a more extreme exercise of the 
judicial power than striking the whole statute and allowing Congress to 
address the conditions that pertained when the statute was considered at 
the outset.43 
 
 38. Id. (“Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a 
statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.”) (quoting Lorillard v. 
Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580 (1978)). Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner give qualified support to this rule in 
their recent book. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 322–26 (2012). However, they do not base it in legislative agreement, but instead on the 
fact that “members of the bar practicing in that field reasonably enough assume that, in statutes 
pertaining to that field, the term bears this same meaning. . . . This footing is sounder than the fanciful 
presumption of legislative knowledge.” Id. at 324. 
 39. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998). 
 40. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 41. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 804 n.4 (“We are bound to honor Meritor on this point not merely 
because of the high value placed on stare decisis in statutory interpretation, but for a further reason as 
well. With the amendments enacted by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress both expanded the 
monetary relief available under Title VII to include compensatory and punitive damages, and modified 
the statutory grounds of several of our decisions. The decision of Congress to leave Meritor intact is 
conspicuous. We thus have to assume that in expanding employers’ potential liability under Title VII, 
Congress relied on our statements in Meritor about the limits of employer liability. To disregard those 
statements now (even if we were convinced of reasons for doing so) would be not only to disregard 
stare decisis in statutory interpretation, but to substitute our revised judgment about the proper 
allocation of the costs of harassment for Congress’s considered decision on the subject.”) (citations 
omitted). See also ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 33, at 1049 (discussing Faragher). 
 42. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY, & Garrett, supra note 33, at 1049. 
 43. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2668 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, 
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B.  THE DIALOGIC MODEL IN PRACTICE OVER TIME 
1.  1967–1990 
Many scholars have examined the circumstances under which 
Congress responds to a Supreme Court decision through a legislative 
override and how the Court reacts to such overrides.44 In the idealized 
pluralistic model of politics and dialogue, “[i]f litigation reveals statutory 
flaws, or produces objectionable judicial interpretations, interest groups can 
appeal to Congress, which can scrutinize the courts’ decisions and revise 
the original statute in light of lessons learned from litigation.”45 
William Eskridge’s leading 1991 study, using an empirical analysis of 
overrides, game theory, and positive political theory, presented a more 
nuanced picture of how the Court interprets federal statutes. He argued that 
“the Court’s statutory interpretation decisions are more responsive to the 
expectations of the current Congress than to those of the enacting 
Congress. But the Court is also responsive to its own institutional and 
personal preferences—especially its preference for coherence and 
predictability in the law.”46 
Consistent with Eskridge, there is a broad, technical literature in 
 
Thomas, & Alito, J.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The dissenters would have struck down the entire 
health care law, including non-germane provisions such as one requiring chain restaurants to display 
nutritional content:  
The Court has not previously had occasion to consider severability in the context of an 
omnibus enactment like the ACA, which includes not only many provisions that are ancillary 
to its central provisions but also many that are entirely unrelated—hitched on because it was a 
quick way to get them passed despite opposition, or because their proponents could exact 
their enactment as the quid pro quo for their needed support. When we are confronted with 
such a so-called ‘Christmas tree,’ a law to which many nongermane ornaments have been 
attached, we think the proper rule must be that when the tree no longer exists the ornaments 
are superfluous. We have no reliable basis for knowing which pieces of the Act would have 
passed on their own. It is certain that many of them would not have, and it is not a proper 
function of this Court to guess which. To sever the statute in that manner would be to make a 
new law, not to enforce an old one. This is not part of our duty.  
Id. at 2675–76 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 44. See, e.g., JEB BARNES, OVERRULED? LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, PLURALISM, AND 
CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS (2004); Eskridge, supra note 29; Lori Hausegger & 
Lawrence Baum, Behind the Scenes: The Supreme Court and Congress in Statutory Interpretation, in 
GREAT THEATRE: THE AMERICAN CONGRESS IN THE 1990S 224 (Herbert F. Weisberg & Samuel C. 
Patterson eds., 1998); Richard A. Paschal, The Continuing Colloquy: Congress and the Finality of the 
Supreme Court, 8 J.L. & POL. 143, 198–205 (1991); Solimine & Walker, supra note 30; Widiss, supra 
note 35. For a detailed look at Congress’s overrides of Supreme Court preemption decisions, see Note, 
New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical Study of Congressional 
Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1604 (2007). 
 45. BARNES, supra note 44, at 6. 
 46. Eskridge, supra note 29, at 334. 
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public choice and positive political theory which generally posits that the 
Justices seek to interpret federal statutes as close as possible to their own 
preferences without being overridden by Congress.47 The chances of 
congressional override depend not only upon the preferences of the median 
member of Congress but also upon the preferences of committee chairs and 
party leaders, who act as the gatekeepers for legislation. 
Jeb Barnes’ detailed study of one hundred randomly-selected 
overrides in the 1974–1990 period found that “members of Congress—or, 
more precisely, members of prestige and re-election committees—tend to 
draft more comprehensive and effective overrides, especially when the 
override issue involves the collection of tax revenue.”48 Further, “if the 
override issue split the courts along partisan lines in the pre-override 
period, federal judges seemed more likely to resist congressional oversight, 
especially when the issue involved the interpretation of the statutory rights 
of discrete, insular minorities, such as African Americans or immigrants.”49 
Nancy Staudt, René Lindstädt, and Jason O’Connor canvassed all 
express congressional responses—and not just overrides—to Supreme 
Court tax decisions from 1954 to 2005. The authors found that: 
[T]he Court-Congress dynamic is not unidimensional but rather nuanced 
and varied. The existing literature implies when Congress responds to 
the Court, it does so in a hostile manner. To be sure, judicial decisions 
often spark a negative response in Congress, but nearly as often the cases 
lead to supportive and positive responses, like codification legislation.50 
Most recently, Deborah Widiss has written a pair of articles examining 
congressional overrides in the employment law context. In the first article, 
she demonstrated that the Supreme Court often narrowly construes 
 
 47. See, e.g., Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court 
Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
263 (1990); Thomas G. Hansford & David F. Damore, Congressional Preferences, Perceptions of 
Threat, and Supreme Court Decision Making, 28 AM. POL. Q. 490 (2000); Virginia A. Hettinger & 
Christopher Zorn, Explaining the Incidence and Timing of Congressional Responses to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 30 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5 (2005); Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, Congressional Control or 
Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949–
1988, 23 RAND J. ECON. 463 (1992). For some skepticism about the approach, see Jeffrey A. Segal, 
Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28 
(1997). 
 48. BARNES, supra note 44, at 18. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Nancy C. Staudt, René Lindstädt, & Jason O’Connor, Judicial Decisions as Legislation: 
Congressional Oversight of Supreme Court Tax Cases, 1954–2005, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1340, 1401 
(2007). 
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congressional override attempts.51 In the second article, she showed that the 
Court often sidesteps congressional overrides when construing similar 
language in a parallel statute,52 in apparent violation of the rule to interpret 
identical language in related statutes to mean the same thing in each 
statute.53 
Eskridge’s 1991 article on overrides was an important corrective to 
the belief that congressional overrides were rare.54 Whether or not the total 
number of overrides has in the past counted as “rare” in any absolute sense, 
in the 1970s and 1980s, Congress used its override power with increasing 
frequency. As Eskridge described: 
The four Congresses from 1967–74 generated an average of six Supreme 
Court overrides per [two-year congressional period], not many more than 
the numbers uncovered in prior studies. In contrast, the eight Congresses 
from 1975–90, beginning with the 94th, generated an average of twelve 
Supreme Court overrides per [two-year congressional period].55  
Like Eskridge’s study, Barnes’s study ended with an examination of 
congressional overrides occurring in 1990.56 Barnes found that “[d]espite 
obstacles, absolute levels of congressional override activity have 
increased.”57 Although Eskridge’s empirical study ended with 1990, his 
article also described the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which overrode at least 
ten Supreme Court cases.58 
 
 51. Widiss, supra note 35. 
 52. Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory 
Interpretation, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 859 (2012). 
 53. Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner endorse the canon, but reject its basis as following the 
Legislature’s intent:  
Though it is often presented as effectuating the legislative “intent,” the related-statute canon is 
not, to tell the truth, based upon a realistic assessment of what the legislature actually meant. 
That would assume an implausible legislative knowledge of related legislation in the past, and 
an impossible legislative knowledge of related legislation yet to be enacted.  
SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 252. They justify the canon as based on “a realistic assessment of 
what the legislature ought to have meant.” Id. 
 54. Eskridge, supra note 29, at 335. But see Bertrall L. Ross, II, Against Constitutional 
Mainstreaming, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1228 (2011) (“[O]verrides are exceedingly rare, making it 
risky to rely on them as a means of ensuring consistency between the Court’s statutory interpretations 
and legislative preferences. In fact, one scholar . . . famously argued [in 1960] that statutory overrides 
are so rare that the Court’s interpretation of statutes is ‘hardly less “final” than the Court’s decisions 
interpreting the Constitution.’”). 
 55. Eskridge, supra note 29, at 338. 
 56. BARNES, supra note 44, at 15. 
 57. Id. at 43 (italics omitted). See also id. at 44 (“Congress is increasingly relying on the passage 
of overrides as a check on the courts”). 
 58. Eskridge, supra note 29, at 333 n.4. I say “at least” ten because Eskridge counts more than 
ten as overrides. But using Eskridge’s own methodology, my results count ten overruled cases, with the 
other cases modified or clarified, but not overruled. See Appendix I. 
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In 2005, Barnes noted that there might be a need for congressional 
overrides to rise over time:  
Congress may need to revise statutes because today’s statutes may be 
increasingly prone to obsolescence and inconsistency; today’s Supreme 
Court is increasingly overwhelmed and less likely to harmonize 
conflicting lower court statutory interpretations; and today’s federal 
judges have greater opportunities to overreach—from the right or the 
left—under the guise of statutory interpretation.59 
2.  1991–2012 
Perhaps because of the strength of the evidence of a rise in override 
activity reported in the earlier studies, scholars have failed to notice that 
congressional overruling of Supreme Court cases slowed down 
dramatically since 1991 and essentially halted in January 2009. Thus, 
writing in 2012, James Brudney stated that “[a]s scholars in law and 
political science have observed, Congress has become more inclined to 
override Court decisions since the early 1970s.”60 Similarly, the 2005 study 
of congressional responses to Supreme Court tax decisions over a fifty-one-
year period by Staudt, Lindstädt, and O’Connor failed to note that of the 
twelve overrides of tax decisions by Congress in the 1954–2005 period, 
only two occurred later than 1986 (and the last in 2001).61 
I examined evidence of congressional overrides of Supreme Court 
statutory interpretation decisions from the end of Eskridge’s study (ending 
in 1990) to the end of 2012, trying my best to replicate Eskridge’s 
methodology so as to allow for an apples-to-apples comparison of 
congressional override activity.62 This proved to be methodologically 
difficult, in part because Congress is now less likely to note the overruling 
of a Supreme Court opinion in a committee report. The Methodological 
Appendix (Appendix IV) at the end of this Article describes in detail how I 
sought to identify overrides from 1991 to 2012; in addition, I erred on the 
 
 59. BARNES, supra note 44, at 34. 
 60. James J. Brudney, Distrust and Clarify: Appreciating Congressional Overrides, 90 TEX. L. 
REV. SEE ALSO 205, 212 (2012), available at 
http://texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/seealso/vol90/pdf/Brudney.pdf. 
 61. Staudt, Lindstädt & O’Connor, supra note 50, at 1384 n.169. 
 62. Eskridge describes his methodology in Eskridge, supra note 29, at 418–20. Hausegger and 
Baum, using what they describe as “similar search methods” to Eskridge’s, identified eight overrides. 
Hausegger & Baum, supra note 44, at 227, 231–32. Hausegger and Baum graciously shared their list of 
1991–96 overrides with me. Our lists overlap but are not entirely consistent given different definitions 
of “override.” For example, both they and I identify eight overrides in the 1995–96 period, although we 
have not made identical judgments on which statutes qualify as overrides. Hausegger and Baum’s list is 
on file with the author. 
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side of inclusion in doubtful cases. 
The results are dramatic: according to Eskridge’s data, the number of 
overrides rose from an average of six Supreme Court overrides per 
Congress in the years 1967–1974 to twelve overrides per Congress in the 
years 1975–1990. According to my updated data, overrides then fell to 5.8 
per Congress from 1991 to 2000 and fell even further to 2.8 overrides per 
Congress from 2001 to 2012.63 See Figure 1. 
 
The 5.8 average overrides per Congress in the 1991–2000 period may 
overstate the amount of override activity, as it is heavily influenced by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, a single law which overturned ten Supreme Court 
cases. 
Overrides have slowed to a trickle in the last four years. Congress 
passed two technical overrides in 2011, one involving trademark issues and 
the other a court venue provision.64 The last significant congressional 
overrides occurred in early 2009. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 
the first bill signed by President Obama, overturned a Supreme Court 
employment decision.65 In addition, the Family Smoking and Tobacco Act 
of 2009 responded to a 2000 Supreme Court decision, giving the FDA 
 
 63. I list all the overridden cases I discovered in Appendix I.  
 64. See Appendix I. 
 65. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-web.html. 
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some authority to regulate tobacco.66 See Figure 2, showing a dramatic 
drop in the number of congressional overrides. 
 
3.  A Closer Look at Post-2000 Congressional Overrides 
In the twelve years since January 2001, Congress has passed only 
fourteen pieces of legislation overriding Supreme Court decisions, and 
overriding a total of seventeen Supreme Court statutory interpretation 
decisions. The overrides fall into three categories: technical overrides, 
bipartisan overrides, and partisan overrides. 
a.  Technical overrides  
Seven of the bills since 2001 were technical overrides contained in 
larger bills. These overrides likely did not garner the attention of many 
members of Congress, with some overrides folded in much larger bills and 
not subject to debate.67 These seven bills included eight overrides making 
 
 66. Jeff Zeleny, Occasional Smoker, 47, Signs Tobacco Bill, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2009, at A15, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/us/politics/23obama.html?_r=0. See Appendix IV. 
 67. I classify an override as “technical” if the New York Times contained no article the same year 
as the bill’s passage noting that Congress was considering overriding, or in fact overrode, one or more 
Supreme Court cases. See also Hausegger & Baum, supra note 44, at 228 (noting that many overrides 
are contained in larger bills where “[i]n all likelihood their inclusion in a bill had little effect on its 
passage; rather, the override was successful because a bill had congressional support for other reasons. 
In several instances it is doubtful that most members of Congress were even aware of the override 
provisions . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
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generally minor changes to Supreme Court statutory precedent.68 
b.  Bipartisan overrides 
Two of the six non-technical override bills passed with broad 
bipartisan majorities. One bill amended the Americans with Disabilities 
Act to strengthen its protections.69 Another renewed expiring provisions of 
the Voting Rights Act for another twenty-five years and changed the 
standards for proving discrimination under the Act.70 Each bill reversed 
two major Supreme Court statutory precedents, and each bill passed in 
large part thanks to the strong leadership and support of the then-chair of 
the House Judiciary Committee, James Sensenbrenner (R-WI). It is unclear 
 
 68. The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, 116 Stat. 21 
(2002), included a reversal of Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 U.S. 206 (2001), a case involving “narrow 
and technical” tax issues concerning the “correct method for determining basis in S Corporation stock.” 
Staudt, Lindstädt, & O’Connor, supra note 50, at 1353 n.37. See also H.R. REP. NO. 107-251, at 52 
(2001); H.R. REP. NO. 107-367, at 3 (2002). The Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 
Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 
(2005), included a provision reversing a Supreme Court case on the habeas corpus rights of immigrants 
accused of crimes, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001). See H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at 173–76 (2005). 
The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (2006), eased the 
standard of proof for trademark holders in dilution claims, overruling Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 
Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003). See H.R. REP. NO. 109-23, at 5 (2005). The OPEN Government Act of 2007, 
Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524 (2007), reversed a major Supreme Court opinion on attorney fees 
in public interest litigation, Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of 
Health & Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 (2001), but only as to attorney fees in litigation related to 
FOIA requests. H.R. REP. NO. 110-59, at 4 (2007) (discussing an earlier version of the Act containing 
the same relevant language as the Act ultimately passed). The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 
2011, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), “responds to the decision of Holmes Group, Inc., v. 
Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., by conferring plenary authority on the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit to hear all patent appeals from lower courts.” H.R. REP. NO. 109-407, at 3 (2006); 
H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 81 (2011) (explicitly endorsing the earlier H.R. REP. NO. 109-407’s 
explanation “for abrogating Holmes”). The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 
111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 (2009) reversed two Supreme Court cases dealing with the standard for proving 
federal money laundering violations. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 4, 10 (2009), reprinted in 2009 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438. The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. 
No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (2011), reversed a 1960 decision, Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), to 
craft a more permissive venue rule in certain federal cases. H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 23–24 (2011), 
reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576. 
 69. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). The Act’s 
language rejected Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). See Appendix I. 
 70. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization 
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006). The Act’s language reversed 
two Supreme Court cases, Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003) and Reno v. Bossier Parish School 
Board, 528 U.S. 320 (2000), which “misconstrued Congress’ original intent in enacting the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965 and narrowed the protections afforded by section 5 of such Act.” H.R. REP. NO. 
109-478, at 2 (2006). The 2006 Amendments were intended to “restore the original purpose to Section 5 
with respect to intentionally discriminatory voting changes.” Id. at 65. 
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whether either bill would have passed without Sensenbrenner’s interest, 
passion, and power.71 
The ADA Amendments clearly overturned Supreme Court (and lower 
court) precedent in a number of important ways, although they left some 
key statutory questions unresolved.72 
As for the Voting Rights Act (VRA) amendments, the story is more 
complicated. Nathaniel Persily explained that Congress’s overriding of one 
of the two Supreme Court voting rights decisions, Georgia v. Ashcroft, was 
done in a deliberately murky way to avoid a deep partisan divide about the 
workings of the Act.73 
The procedure by which the VRA Amendments passed was highly 
unusual, as Richard Pildes explained: 
[T]he enacted law was “virtually unchanged” from the version first 
introduced in the House. . . . [I]t is widely known that the bill was 
drafted by the civil rights community, then pushed through the House 
process by Chairman Sensenbrenner, for whom, as Persily does note, 
“nothing was going to stand in [the] way.” The House hearings were not 
designed to provide a full airing of the issues, but for advocates to build 
 
 71. See Chai R. Feldblum, Kevin Barry & Emily A. Benfer, The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 
13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 187, 195–96 (2008) (“The first serious breakthrough for the ADA Restoration 
Act happened in the summer of 2006. Congressman Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI), then Chair of the 
House Judiciary Committee, conveyed his interest in sponsoring a bill that would restore the broad 
coverage of disability under the ADA. Congressman Sensenbrenner’s wife, Cheryl Sensenbrenner, had 
been on the board of the AAPD since 2003 and was an enthusiastic supporter of the ADA Restoration 
Act. . . . Having a senior Republican Member of Congress and Chair of the House Judiciary Committee 
express his interest in sponsoring an ADA Restoration Act significantly changed the political dynamics 
around the possible success of such a bill.”); Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New 
Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 180–81 (2007) (“One cannot overstate the importance of the 
unlikely leadership of James Sensenbrenner, Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, in 
pushing through the legislation. He wanted the reauthorization of the Voting Rights Act to occur on his 
watch, and, consistent with his leadership style on other issues, nothing was going to stand in his way. 
Pursuant to the rules of the Republican Conference, however, his term as Chairman was to expire at the 
end of 2006, a year before section 5 of the VRA was scheduled to sunset. Therefore, the timetable for 
the legislation was moved up a year, with House hearings held between October 2005 and May 2006.”). 
 72. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 51–54 (2009). 
 73. Persily, supra note 71, at 218 (“[T]here are good reasons why Congress left this important 
provision [reversing Georgia v. Ashcroft] undefined. The fractious Senate Report makes clear that 
Democrats and Republicans hold dramatically differing views as to what this standard requires. The 
other available legislative history elides the likely political effects of various valid interpretations. The 
potential interpretations of the law run the gamut from entrenching either Republican or Democratic 
gerrymanders. The central conceptual disputes revolve around the types of districts and candidates 
protected by the standard, the data necessary to evaluate the ability to elect, and the degree of flexibility 
jurisdictions should be accorded to adapt to political changes throughout the twenty-five year tenure of 
this law.”). 
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what Persily calls “a lawyer’s brief,” one that would enable the renewed 
VRA to withstand later constitutional challenge. In the House, virtually 
none of the academics with years of expertise in the study of the VRA 
were called to testify. Second, Persily exposes just how dramatically the 
enacted VRA papered over and obscured the profound policy conflicts 
that actually exist on these issues in Congress. While the Senate passed 
the law by a 98-0 vote, the Senate Judiciary Committee could not agree 
on a committee report explaining what the bill actually did, and did not 
even issue the report until after the Senate had approved the bill and just 
before the President signed it into law—and even then, with the support 
of committee members from only one political party.74 
A third bipartisan override was the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act of 2009, which gave the Food and Drug 
Administration the power to regulate tobacco as a drug.75 Congress used 
the law to respond to a 2000 Supreme Court decision holding that Congress 
had not given the FDA such power.76 The largest tobacco company in the 
United States, Philip Morris, supported the bill, and the final vote was 
broadly bipartisan77—although twenty-nine Senate Republicans (and one 
Democrat) first voted to filibuster the bill.78 
c.  Partisan overrides 
Three overrides during the 2000–2012 period divided the Congress 
strongly on party lines. This contrasts sharply with the prior period, when 
partisan overrides were rare.79 In the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 
Congress partially reversed the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld by further limiting the habeas corpus rights of alien enemy 
 
 74. Richard H. Pildes, Political Avoidance, Constitutional Theory, and the VRA, 117 YALE L.J. 
POCKET PART 148, 151 (2007). 
 75. Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 
(2009). See Appendix IV. 
 76. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). See id. § 3(1); H.R. REP. 
NO. 111-58(I) (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 468, 470 (noting a 2000 Supreme Court case 
finding that the FDA lacked authority over tobacco products and quoting language appearing in Brown 
& Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161). 
 77. Duff Wilson, Senate Approves Tight Regulation Over Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2009, 
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/12/business/12tobacco.html; Duff Wilson, 
Congress Passes Measure on Tobacco Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2009, at B3, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/13/business/13tobacco.html?_r=0. 
 78. On the Cloture Motion S.Amdt.1247 to H.R.1256 (Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco 
Control Act), GOVTRACK (June 8, 2009), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2009/s204. 
 79. See infra Figure 12 and accompanying text; Solimine & Walker, supra note 30, at 452 
(noting that only seven of eighteen overrides identified by Eskridge during the 1981–1988 period 
provoked partisan controversy). 
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combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba and elsewhere.80 Republicans 
favored the bill in the House by a vote of 218-7 and in the Senate by a vote 
of 53-1. Democrats opposed the bill in the House by a vote of 32-162 and 
in the Senate by a vote of 12-32.81 
In the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Congress reversed the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Company by extending the statute of limitations in certain employment 
discrimination suits82. President Obama campaigned on the Republicans’ 
earlier blockage of this bill as an issue of equal rights for women, pushing 
heavily for its passage as a presidential candidate, and the Act was the first 
bill he signed as President.83 Democrats favored the bill in the House by a 
vote of 247-4 and in the Senate by a vote of 54- 0 (Ted Kennedy did not 
vote). Republicans opposed the bill in the House by a vote of 3-173 and in 
the Senate by a vote of 4-36.84 Notably, the four Republican senators who 
voted in favor of the bill were the Senate’s four Republican women 
senators (Susan Collins, Kay Bailey Hutchison, Lisa Murkowski, and 
Olympia Snowe). 
Finally—and perhaps a bit more debatably—I classify the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005 as a partisan override even though the final larger 
Pentagon bill containing the override passed on a bipartisan basis. The part 
of the bill consisting of an override reversed the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Rasul v. Bush, which gave Guantanamo detainees the right to challenge 
their detentions in civilian court.85 On an amendment to add this provision 
to a larger bill, forty-two of forty-seven Democrats voting cast a vote 
 
 80. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006); Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); John Yoo, Congress to Courts: “Get Out of the War on Terror,” 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2006, at A18, available at http://www.aei.org/article/society-and-
culture/congress-to-courts-get-out-of-the-war-on-terror/. 
 81. For the House totals, see Final Vote Results for Roll Call 508 (Military Commissions Act), 
Legislation & Votes, Office of the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives (Sept. 29, 2006, 2:47 
PM), http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2006/roll508.xml. For the Senate totals, see U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 
109th Congress—2nd Session, Legislation & Records, United States Senate, 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=2
&vote=00259 (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
 82. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007); Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).  
 83. Stolberg, supra note 65; Stephanie Mencimer, Lilly Ledbetter: Obama’s Newest Ad Star, 
MOTHER JONES (Sept. 23, 2008, 9:44 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2008/09/lilly-ledbetter-
obamas-newest-ad-star. 
 84. For the House totals, see House Vote #37 in 2009, S. 181 (111th): Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay 
Act of 2009, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2009/h37 (last visited Jan. 4, 
2013). For the Senate totals, see Senate Vote #14 in 2009, S. 181 (111th): Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act 
of 2009, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2009/s14 (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). 
 85. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
HASE7 1/25/2013  12:30 PM 
120 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:--- 
against the amendment.86 Despite these partisan beginnings, Democrats 
ultimately voted for the final bill for a number of reasons, including the fact 
that it contained another amendment barring torture of enemy combatants, 
and that it was within an even broader defense bill.87 Further, Democrat 
and chief conference negotiator Senator Carl Levin responded to criticism 
from human rights groups for agreeing to a bill containing the detainee 
court provision, explaining “that he had settled for the less damaging of 
two bad outcomes, [and] saying he had deflected more onerous provisions 
that House Republicans wanted, including a demand that interrogators who 
abused prisoners be granted immunity from prosecution.”88 
C.  THE CONSEQUENCES OF FEW CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDES 
Whether or not one subscribes to the view of positive political 
theorists that Supreme Court Justices interpret federal statutes in line with 
their personal preferences and their strategic calculations about the chances 
of reversal, there seems to be little doubt as things currently stand that a 
majority of Supreme Court Justices is usually getting its way when it 
comes to statutory interpretation. Supreme Court interpretations of federal 
statutes are now very likely to be final. The combination of Supreme Court 
interpretive rules premised on the Court-Congress dialogue, and the failure 
of Congress to override any significant number of Court interpretations of 
federal statutes, has given the Justices the last word on statutory 
interpretation questions almost as often as they get the last word on 
constitutional questions. 
 
 86. Eric Schmitt, Senate Approves Limiting Rights of U.S. Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 
2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/11/politics/11detain.html. 
 87. Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in 
the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 
2680 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2006)).  
 88. Eric Schmitt & Tim Golden, Lawmakers Back Use of Evidence Coerced from Detainees, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2005, at A21, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/17/politics/17detain.html?_r=0. See also Carl Hulse & Eric Schmitt, 
Negotiators Say Differences Over Ban on Abuse Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2005, at A19, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/12/politics/12abuse.html. Finally, there is one override which is 
difficult to classify into one of the three categories. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005), was a major piece of legislation. One relatively minor provision changed the 
rules for assessing the citizenship of an unincorporated association for purposes of diversity 
jurisdiction. In changing the standard, Congress arguably overruled a 1965 Supreme Court case, United 
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. R. H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965). The bill was supported 
mainly by Republicans. Only nineteen Democratic Senators (and one independent Senator, Jim 
Jeffords, who was a Republican but then left the party and caucused with the Democrats) voted for the 
bill. Senate Vote #9 in 2005, S.5 (109th): Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, GOVTRACK (Feb. 10, 
2005), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/109-2005/s9. This seems to stand on the cusp of the three 
categories. 
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Consider in this regard the Court’s dispute over severability in the 
hyperpartisan and uniquely prominent Supreme Court health care case. A 
majority of the Court held that the requirement that states opt into a new 
Medicaid program or risk losing all of their medical funding was 
unconstitutional as exceeding the Congress’s spending power.89 The 
dissenters agreed on this point, but also would have struck down the 
“individual mandate” portion of the law, requiring individuals to purchase 
health insurance or pay a penalty to the government, as exceeding 
Congress’s taxing and Commerce Clause powers.90 The majority upheld 
this provision as a permissible exercise of Congress’s taxing power.91 
Both the majority and dissent had to confront the question of 
severability, because each took the position that a portion of the law was 
unconstitutional. With part of the law unconstitutional, should the 
remaining parts survive? Both opinions referred to congressional intent in 
their severability analyses. 
The majority held that the unconstitutional Medicaid provision was 
severable from the rest of the Act:  
We have no way of knowing how many States will accept the terms of 
the [Medicaid] expansion, but we do not believe Congress would have 
wanted the whole Act to fall, simply because some may choose not to 
participate. The other reforms Congress enacted, after all, will remain 
fully operative as a law, and will still function in a way consistent with 
Congress’ basic objectives in enacting the statute. Confident that 
Congress would not have intended anything different, we conclude that 
the rest of the Act need not fall in light of our constitutional holding.92 
The dissenters reached the opposite conclusion, holding that even the 
unrelated provisions of the health care law needed to fall with the 
unconstitutional provisions. Striking the entire statute, the dissenters 
claimed, was actually a lesser exercise of judicial power than keeping the 
rest intact, because striking the entire act would “allow[] Congress” to 
decide after the decision which provisions to reenact.93 
Justice Scalia (one of the dissenting Justices) had it half right when he 
remarked on the third day of the health care oral argument that the danger 
of severance was that there would not be enough votes in the Senate to 
overcome a filibuster of a bill repealing the rest of the Act: “You can’t 
 
 89. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604–08 (2012). 
 90. Id. at 2643 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, J.J., dissenting). 
 91. Id. at 2593–2601. 
 92. Id. at 2608 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 93. Id. at 2668 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, J.J., dissenting). 
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repeal the rest of the Act because you’re not going to get 60 votes in the 
Senate to repeal the rest.”94 This was only half right because if the Court 
would have stricken the entire statute (as Justice Scalia voted to do with the 
other dissenters), there also would not have been enough votes in the 
Senate to overcome a filibuster of a bill reinstating the rest of the Act. 
Indeed, during the same oral argument at which Justice Scalia made 
the “60 votes” comment, he could only see the danger of the Court 
mistakenly allowing the rest of the law to stand but not the parallel danger 
of mistakenly striking down the entire law. Justice Scalia called upon the 
lawyer Paul Clement to recognize the danger of “legislative inertia” when 
Clement conceded in response to a question by Justice Sotomayor: 
[I]f you strike down only the individual mandate, Congress could say the 
next day: Well, that’s the last thing we ever wanted to do so we will 
strike down the rest of the statute immediately and then try to fix the 
problem. So, whatever you do, Congress is going to have options.95 
More realistically, Clement should have said, “So whatever you do is 
likely to be the last word.” The Court’s severability decision was almost 
certain to be final because neither party in the partisan Congress would be 
 
 94. Transcript of Oral Argument at 67, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 2012 U.S. Trans. 
LEXIS 28 (2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-400). 
 95. Consider this exchange: 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I want a bottom line is why don't we let Congress fix it? 
MR. CLEMENT: Well, let me answer the bottom line question, which is, no matter what you 
do in this case, at some point there's going to be—if you strike down the mandate, there is 
going to be something for Congress to do. The question is really, what task do you want to 
give Congress. Do you want to give Congress the task of fixing the statute after something 
has been taken out, especially a provision at the heart, or do you want to give Congress the 
task of fixing health care? And I think it would be better in this situation— 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We are not taking—If we strike down one provision, we are not 
taking that power away from Congress. Congress could look at it without the mandatory 
coverage provision and say, this model doesn't work; let's start from the beginning. Or it could 
choose to fix what it has. We are not declaring—one portion doesn't force Congress into any 
path. 
MR. CLEMENT: And of course that's right, Justice Sotomayor, and no matter what you do 
here, Congress will have the options available. So if you, if you strike down only the 
individual mandate, Congress could say the next day: Well, that's the last thing we ever 
wanted to do so we will strike down the rest of the statute immediately and then try to fix the 
problem. So whatever you do, Congress is going to have options. The question is— 
JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, there is such a thing as legislative inertia, isn't there? 
MR. CLEMENT: That's exactly what I was going to say, Justice Scalia, which is, I think the 
question for this Court is, we all recognize there is legislative inertia. And then the question 
is: What is the best result in light of that reality? 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Are you suggesting that we should take on more power to the 
Court? 
MR. CLEMENT: No— 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Because Congress would choose to take one path rather than 
another. That's sort of taking onto the Court more power than one I think would want. 
Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–6, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 2012 U.S. Trans. LEXIS 28 
(2012) (Nos. 11-393, 11-400). 
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able to repeal or reinstate the relevant parts of the health care law through 
the normal legislative process. 
A bipartisan override might have been possible under special 
circumstances, such as if the Court struck the mandate and retained the 
entire rest of the law—putting the powerful insurance industry into an 
untenable situation financially. There will still be some overrides that even 
a polarized Congress will agree upon on a bipartisan basis.96 But the main 
point remains clear: the end of override dialogue increases the Court’s 
power at Congress’s expense. 
D.  OVERRIDES IN BROADER PERSPECTIVE 
Although the decline in the number of overrides has strengthened the 
Supreme Court compared to Congress, a full assessment of the relative 
power of the Court and Congress depends on more than the number of 
congressional overrides. Consider three additional factors: 
First, and significantly, Congress retains some power over the Court 
through the Senate’s power to confirm Supreme Court Justices, an issue 
considered below in Part III. (Of course, Congress also has the power to 
impeach Justices.) 
Second, even in the rare circumstance in which Congress overrides a 
Supreme Court statutory interpretation decision, Widiss’s evidence shows 
that the Court sometimes ignores or sidesteps it. Widiss notes that Congress 
was careful in its override of the Ledbetter decision to amend not just the 
statute directly at issue in the case (Title VII), but parallel provisions under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act in order to avoid this reaction 
from the Court.97 More generally, the Court has great control over its 
docket and the scope of its rulings. These facts help expand the power of 
 
 96. To take another recent example, Congress passed the Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-294, 124 Stat. 3177 (2010), in response to United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 
1577 (2010), which held an earlier statute barring depiction of animal cruelty violated the First 
Amendment. See 156 CONG. REC. S7653–54 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010) (statement of Sen. Patrick 
Leahy). While this was not a statutory override, it does illustrate that there are some instances in which 
even a polarized Congress may find common ground against the Supreme Court. 
 97. Widiss, supra note 52, at 923 n.371. Widiss notes an interesting lower court application of 
the acquiescence rule:  
[Congress’s override] was insufficient to end reliance on Ledbetter as a shadow precedent. In 
a recent case arising under the FMLA, the district court held Ledbetter controlling because 
Congress had not amended the FMLA when it amended these other statutes. Maher v. Int’l 
Paper Co., 600 F. Supp. 2d 940, 950 n.5 (W.D. Mich. 2009). 
Widiss, supra note 52, at 923 n.371. 
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the Court against Congress.  
Third, when it comes to constitutional adjudication, the Court also has 
expanded its power against Congress to strike down federal statutes as 
unconstitutional. For example, the Court in the last few decades has 
required Congress, like litigants in court, to come forward with specific 
evidence of unconstitutional action by states in order to be permitted to 
exercise some of its powers against the states.98 In one of the most recent 
important examples of the Court imposing a tough evidentiary standard on 
Congress, the Court warned Congress that it was likely to overturn a key 
provision of the Voting Rights Act if Congress did not go back and rewrite 
the law, taking into account recent evidence of state racial discrimination in 
voting which might justify the new law.99 Yet the same forces which seem 
to inhibit congressional overrides of Court statutory interpretation decisions 
may also be responsible for Congress’s failure to respond to the Court’s 
invitation to update the Voting Rights Act, and the issue of the Act’s 
constitutionality likely will be back before the Court soon. 
In the health care case, it is unclear whether the Court’s Spending 
Clause holding or the opinion of the four dissenters combined with Chief 
Justice Roberts’ opinion on the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
power will rein in congressional power when similar issues arise. Whether 
it does or not is in the hands of Supreme Court Justices, not Congress. 
II.  EXPLAINING THE DECLINE IN CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDES 
What explains the steep decline in overrides by Congress of Supreme 
Court statutory decisions? I argue below that the increase in political 
polarization in Congress is a likely (at least partial) culprit. Before turning 
to polarization, I consider other potential sources for the decline, finding 
that a decline in Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions may also 
be part of the answer. 
 
 98. See generally Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH L. REV. 80 
(2001) (exploring recent judicial activism and the corresponding disrespect of Congress). 
 99. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder (NAMUDNO), 557 U.S. 193, 229 (2009) 
(“The burden remains with Congress to prove that the extreme circumstances warranting § 5’s 
enactment persist today. A record of scattered infringement of the right to vote is not a constitutionally 
acceptable substitute.”). See Richard L. Hasen, Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 
2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181 (analyzing how the Court avoided making a constitutional decision in 
NAMUDNO). 
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A.  DECLINE IN (MAJOR) FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
At first blush, it might appear that the decline in overrides simply 
tracks a decline in the number of federal statutes passed by Congress. If 
Congress is generally passing fewer laws, then it is possible that laws 
which override Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases have declined 
at a proportional rate. The data show that the number of public laws passed 
by Congress indeed has declined markedly in the past two decades. But the 
pattern of passage in federal legislation does not match up with the pattern 
of congressional override activity. 
As illustrated in Figure 3, according to data from the “Resume of 
Congressional Activity” produced by Congress, the number of public laws 
passed by Congress has declined over time.100 
 
 
Despite the decline, the pattern on legislation rates generally does not 
track the pattern on Congressional override activity illustrated in Figure 1. 
From 1967–74, the first period of Eskridge’s override study, Congress 
 
 100. I computed the data using the Résumé of Congressional Activity for each Congress. Résumé 
of Congressional Activity, United States Senate, 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/two_column_table/Resumes.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). 
See also Ezra Klein’s WonkBlog, which alerted me to this data set. Ezra Klein, 14 Reasons Why This Is 
the Worst Congress Ever, WASH. POST (July 13, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-
klein/wp/2012/07/13/13-reasons-why-this-is-the-worst-congress-ever/. 
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passed an average of 648 public laws per two-year Congress. From 1975–
90, during the period of a doubling of the amount of override activity 
compared to the 1967–74 period, the average number of public laws 
actually fell to 559. From 1991 through 2010, the average number of public 
laws fell to 410 per Congress, a drop of 27 percent compared to the 1975–
1990 period. During the same period, the number of overrides per session 
dropped 68 percent compared to the 1975–1990 period (and nearly 78 
percent comparing the 1975–1990 period with the 2001–2012 period). 
Looking at the overall trends, the number of overrides does not appear 
closely correlated to the total number of public laws which Congress 
passes. 
Nor does the override pattern seem related to the amount of “major 
legislation” passed in Congress, at least according to one measure of 
“major legislation.”101 Using data compiled by David Mayhew of major 
federal legislation in the post-World War II period,102 I examined 
Congress’s record of passing such legislation from 1967 to 2010. The 
average number of major laws passed per Congress in the 1967–74 period 
was nineteen. Congress averaged just 10.1 major laws from the 1975–90 
period (the period in which overrides doubled) and that number rose to 
twelve major laws per Congress from 1991–2010 when overrides fell 
dramatically. There appears to be no relationship between the number of 
overrides and the amount of “major legislation” passed by Congress. 
 
 101. The measure I use for “major legislation,” David Mayhew’s count based primarily upon 
year-end press coverage, is controversial. See SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK 79 (2003) (noting that Mayhew and his critics disagree on 
whether the consequence of major legislation differs in times of divided or united government). On the 
relationship of Mayhew’s laws and political polarization, see Nolan McCarty, The Policy Effects of 
Political Polarization, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: ACTIVIST GOVERNMENT 
AND THE RISE OF CONSERVATISM 223, 237–40 (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol, eds., 2007). See also 
NOLAN MCCARTY, KEITH T. POOLE, & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, POLARIZED AMERICA: THE DANCE OF 
IDEOLOGY AND UNEQUAL RICHES 183 (2006) (“Polarization appears to reduce output across a broad 
spectrum of possible legislation.”). For purposes of this article, Mayhew’s rough measure seems 
adequate enough to measure whether the pattern of passage of major legislation mirrors the override 
patterns in Congress. 
 102. Mayhew originally compiled data through 1991 for his book, DAVID MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE 
GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946–1990 (1991), and posted that 
data, along with updates on major legislation (for the second edition of his book) through 2008 on his 
website. David Mayhew, Datasets for Divided We Govern (1991), 
http://pantheon.yale.edu/~dmayhew/data3.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). He supplied the 2009–2010 
list of major legislation to me via email, as it is not yet posted on his site. 
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One obvious question is why the amount of “major legislation” has 
not declined along with the decline in overrides. The answer seems to be 
that not all “major legislation” is equally important, and Congress always 
has an incentive to pass some legislation to show that Congress is 
“working” and sometimes needs to respond to major external events (such 
as September 11 or the 2008 financial crisis). It would take a much finer-
grained measure than Mayhew’s “major legislation” measure to know if the 
quality and reach of congressional legislation has declined over time. 
B.  A DECLINE IN (OR CHANGE IN DIRECTION OF) SUPREME COURT 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION DECISIONS 
Although override activity does not track the general trend of 
lawmaking in Congress, trends of Supreme Court statutory interpretation 
activity look somewhat more promising. Over time, the Supreme Court has 
decided fewer federal statutory interpretation cases, just as it has decided 
fewer cases overall.103 
 
 103. On the reasons for the decline in the Court’s docket over time, see Ryan J. Owens & David 
A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219 (2012). 
Chief Justice Roberts recently opined that the overall number of Supreme Court cases may be dropping 
because of a supposed drop in the amount of “major legislation” passed by Congress. Jeannette Lee, 
Chief Justice Notes Lack of Major Legislation Passed By Congress, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 4, 2007), 
http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/politics/20070504-0318-wst-chiefjustice-alaska.html (“‘No one 
actually knows why the number of cases we are taking is declining,’ said Roberts . . . . ‘I think there 
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I analyzed the trends with Supreme Court statutory interpretation case 
law using the Supreme Court Database maintained at Washington 
University in St. Louis.104 
 
 
As Figure 5 illustrates, from 1967 to 1974, the first period of 
Eskridge’s override study, the Supreme Court averaged about forty-three 
statutory interpretation cases per year.105 From 1975 to 1990, the Court 
averaged forty-eight statutory interpretation cases per year. The doubling in 
overrides from the first to the second periods in Eskridge’s study cannot be 
explained by the slight rise in the number of statutory interpretation cases 
in the second period. 
In the years 1991–2010, the Court averaged 27.7 cases per year, a 43 
percent drop compared to the 1975–1990 period. The drop in the number of 
Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases therefore may explain part of 
the drop in the number of congressional overrulings: there are simply fewer 
Supreme Court cases for Congress to overrule (though of course Congress 
 
really are three significant reasons. The first is the lack of any major legislation coming out of Congress 
in the last couple of decades.’”). Mayhew’s data are inconsistent with this hypothesis. 
 104. THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/index.php (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). 
The database is based upon data originally coded by Harold J. Spaeth. The Genesis of the Database, 
THE SUPREME COURT DATABASE, http://scdb.wustl.edu/about.php (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). 
 105. I computed these figures using the U.S. Supreme Court Database, supra note 104, searching 
all Supreme Court opinions from 1967–2010 coded as involving “Federal Statutes.” 
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can also choose to overrule cases from earlier periods). It is not clear how 
much of the decline in override activity may be attributable to a decline in 
the number of Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions, given how 
the earlier patterns in overrides and Supreme Court decisions do not match 
up. 
A related possibility is that Congress now overrides fewer cases 
because members of Congress are now more likely to agree with the 
outcome of Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases: there is no need 
to override a correct decision.106 
This hypothesis seems unlikely when judged against the evidence. As 
Figure 6 demonstrates, since the mid-1970s, Supreme Court statutory 
interpretation decisions coded as “liberal” have generally ranged between 
40 and 60 percent of total statutory decisions.107 There is no general pattern 
of ideological direction which could explain a decline in overrides: liberals 
and conservatives in Congress each are likely to disagree with around half 
of the Court’s statutory interpretation decisions. Thus, there is no overall 
change in ideological direction on the Court in the relevant period which 
would explain the pattern of sharply declining overrides. 
 
 
 106. Alternatively, it is possible that congressional deference to Supreme Court statutory 
interpretation has increased in the last twenty years. I am unaware of any evidence that Members’ of 
Congress attitudes toward the Supreme Court has recently shifted in this direction. 
 107. The U.S. Supreme Court Database coded the direction of these cases as “liberal” or 
“conservative.” 
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C.  POLITICAL POLARIZATION 
With these other potential explanations at most providing only a part 
of the story, I turn to the possibility that overrides are declining in part 
because of political polarization. The data here draw from Keith Poole and 
Howard Rosenthal’s well-accepted data posted at Voteview.com.108 Poole, 
Rosenthal, and additional collaborators have coded roll call votes and other 
data to produce ideological measures for each member of the House and 
Senate. 
Using these data, there is no question that today’s Congress is the 
most polarized by party since the late nineteenth-century.109 Congress is 
likely to become even more polarized going forward, especially as the few 
remaining moderate senators leave the Senate, with many likely replaced 
by Tea Party Republicans (for example, Ted Cruz replaced Texas’s Kay 
Bailey Huchison110). 
In a story told in great detail elsewhere,111 polarization in Congress 
 
 108. These data and next five charts (Figures 7–11) are used with the permission of Professor 
Poole. 
 109. An Update on Political Polarization (Through 2011) (Jan. 30, 2012), VOTEVIEW BLOG, 
http://voteview.com/blog/?p=284. 
 110. Tea Party Darling Cruz Wins Texas’ US Senate Race, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 7, 2012, 
http://www.kvue.com/news/Tea-party-darling-Cruz-wins-Texas-US-Senate-seat-177570921.html. 
 111. See, e.g., McCarty, The Policy Effects of Political Polarization, supra note 101, at 224–32; 
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began with the ideological realignment in the South following the Civil 
Rights Era, as conservative Southern Democrats moved to the Republican 
Party. Figure 7 shows the ideological distance between the parties over 
time using the well-respected database of roll call votes compiled by Poole, 
Rosenthal and their newer collaborators. 
 
Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in 
America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 287–97 (2011). 
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Figure 7. 
 
Figures 8 and 9 show the steep decline in the percentage of moderates 
in the House and Senate. 
Figure 8. 
 
Figure 9. 
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Figures 10 and 11 show the sharp drop in the number of “overlapping” 
Senators and House members—Republicans who are more liberal than the 
most conservative Democrat and Democrats who are more conservative 
than the most liberal Republican. These political animals are now extinct. 
Figure 10. 
 
Figure 11. 
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These charts tell a story consistent with Eskridge’s evidence of the 
changes over time in the number of congressional overrides. Before the 
1990s, there were a number of liberal Republicans and conservative 
Democrats in the House, and many more moderates in both parties. This 
created ample space for bipartisan overrides of Supreme Court statutory 
decisions. The number of moderates started plummeting in the 1980s and 
the trend has continued ever since. The decline of these moderates has 
made it harder to put together a winning voting coalition to overturn 
Supreme Court statutory decisions. 
It is not only that moderates, liberal Republicans, and conservative 
Democrats have left Congress; it is that those who remain have become 
less willing to seek bipartisan compromise. Of the “Gang of 14” who 
sought a compromise on federal judicial nominations in 2005 and averted a 
filibuster showdown, “just seven will be in the Senate in 2013. And that 
number includes Arizona Sen. John McCain (R) who moved heavily 
rightward to win his primary election in the 2010 election cycle.”112 
Before the 1990s in Congress, there was more room for bipartisan 
legislation to reverse the Supreme Court. The realignment in Congress and 
steep dip in the number of moderates in the late-1980s and early-1990s 
coincides with the steep decline in the number of congressional 
overrides.113 
 
 112. Chris Cillizza, Think This Congress is Bad? Just Wait., WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2012, 11:20 
AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/think-this-congress-is-bad-just-
wait/2012/08/01/gJQAvdTKPX_blog.html. 
 113. See Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration of 
Constitutional Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 782 (2011) (“[P]arty polarization has played a 
significant role in the decline in constitutional hearings in every congressional committee except the 
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Consider the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which reversed a large number 
of conservative Supreme Court decisions interpreting Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. It is almost unthinkable today that such a measure 
could pass in the very conservative Republican House, or get past a 
Republican filibuster in a Democratic Senate. Even the Voting Rights Act 
renewal, which passed the Senate on a 98-0 vote in 2006, could well have 
been filibustered if it came up now given a sea change in Republican 
attitudes about the Act within the covered states and the rise of mainstream 
Republicans ready to contend that a key part of the Act is 
unconstitutional.114 Indeed, renewal might not even get a vote in the 
Republican House today. The hardening of positions likely explains 
congressional silence after the Supreme Court signaled that Congress 
needed to fix the Voting Rights Act or the Court would declare it 
unconstitutional. 
Partisan overrides of Supreme Court statutory decisions remain 
possible, but only when the conditions are right. Republicans were able to 
overturn the Hamdan decision granting certain habeas rights to enemy 
combatants by having a Republican President strongly pushing for the 
reversal and enough Senate Democrats conservative on national security 
issues to allow the vote to go through in the Senate. Democrats were able to 
overturn Ledbetter and its tough statute of limitations for certain 
employment discrimination claims when the President made it a campaign 
issue and a priority as he entered office with high political capital, 
Democrats controlled the House and Senate (and at the time had nearly a 
filibuster-proof majority), and Senate Democrats gained the support of 
women Republican Senators who crossed party lines to vote in favor of the 
bill. 
Both of these overrides required an unusual set of events: a President, 
House, and Senate majority of the same party; a President with ample 
political capital; and enough cross-over votes to beat a filibuster 
(something which looks unlikely to occur frequently as the remaining 
Senate moderates retire or are beaten in elections). Consider again how 
President Obama got the health care law through Congress without a vote 
to spare in the Senate. Unless those conditions arise again, it is hard to see 
 
Judiciary Committees.”). 
 114. Josh Gerstein, Voting Rights Act Under Siege, POLITICO (Feb. 19, 2012, 7:06 AM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/73058.html; Richard L. Hasen, Online VRA Symposium: 
The Voting Rights Act, Congressional Silence, and the Political Polarization, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 10, 
2012, 11:45 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/online-vra-symposium-the-voting-rights-act-
congressional-silence-and-the-political-polarization/.  
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either side being able to accomplish much to change health care law even if 
Republicans capture the Senate and the Presidency in 2016. 
To test whether we are seeing a decline in the number of bipartisan 
overrides compared to partisan overrides I examined each of the laws 
which appeared on both Mayhew’s list of major legislation and on either 
Eskridge’s list of overrides (confined to overrides of the Supreme Court, 
and not lower federal court cases) or my list of overrides from 1991 to 
2010 contained in Appendix I.115 By focusing on these major cases, I aim 
to eliminate most technical overrides and focus on those laws which were 
likely to be significant pieces of legislation salient to Members of 
Congress.116 
With one exception,117 I classified an override from the list as 
“bipartisan” if on the final roll call vote the bill obtained “yes” votes from 
at least twenty senators of each party and at least forty House members of 
each party. If there were fewer than twenty senators from each party or 
forty House members from each party supporting the bill, I classified it as 
“partisan.”118 
There are thirty overlapping laws on Mayhew’s list of major 
legislation and on Eskridge’s or my list of overrides.119 Six of these 
overrides occurred in the 1967–1974 period, and five of six were bipartisan 
overrides (83 percent). Seventeen of these overrides occurred in the 1975–
1990 period, and fifteen of seventeen (88 percent) were bipartisan 
overrides. One of the two partisan overrides in this period missed being 
classified as bipartisan by a single Senate vote (nineteen Republican 
senators voted for it). 
 
 115. In the analysis which follows, I exclude 2011–12 because Mayhew has not yet listed his 
major legislation for this period. 
 116. Some of these overrides appear to be minor pieces of more significant legislation, however. 
 117. This exception is for the Detainee Transfer Act. See supra notes 85–88. 
 118. These figures for measuring bipartisan support are somewhat arbitrary. If I lower the number 
of supporting senators in each party from twenty to only ten Senators, I would classify as “bipartisan” 
only three additional overrides out of the total number of overrides of major legislation (including 
amendments) from 1967–2010. If I raise the number of supporting House members from each party 
from forty to eighty House members, I would classify as “bipartisan” only three fewer overrides out of 
the total number of overrides of major legislation (including amendments) from 1967–2010. The fact 
that my numbers change little if I halve the number of senators or double the number of House 
members indicates that my standard of twenty senators and forty House members is a reasonable 
measure of bipartisanship. (Of these six total possible changes, only one of the six involves legislation 
passed since 1990, the Military Commissions Act of 2006, which was supported by twelve Democratic 
senators and would be classified as bipartisan if I lowered the standard to the support of ten senators of 
each party.) 
 119. See infra Appendix II for the list of overlapping overrides. 
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Seven overrides from this list occurred from 1991 to 2010. Just under 
half of the overrides were bipartisan; just over half were partisan, with one 
law barely being classified as bipartisan. The seven overrides are: the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 (overruling nine Supreme Court civil rights cases) 
(bipartisan); the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (bipartisan, 
although the override of Barnett Bank of Marion County., N.A. v. Nelson120 
seems minor and did not get mentioned at any point in the New York 
Times); the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (overruling Rasul) (partisan); 
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (overturning a Supreme Court 
decision on diversity jurisdiction of unincorporated associations) (barely 
partisan); the Military Commission Act of 2006 (overruling Hamdan) 
(partisan); the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 
2009 (giving the FDA authority to regulate tobacco products) (bipartisan); 
and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (overruling Ledbetter) 
(partisan). 
Figure 12 shows the percentage of partisan overrides in each of the 
three periods. 
 
This rise in partisan overrides of major legislation is subject to a 
caveat. Mayhew’s list of major legislation does not count many significant 
amendments to existing law (which override Supreme Court case law).121 I 
 
 120. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996). 
 121. On the conditions when Congress is likely to amend significant legislation, see Forrest 
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identified eight significant amendments from Eskridge’s or my list not 
included on Mayhew’s list from 1972 to 2010.122 Each of these 
amendments, including two in the most recent 1991–2010 period, were 
bipartisan overrides of Supreme Court cases. Figure 13 shows that with 
these laws included, the extent of bipartisan overrides in the most recent 
period does not look quite as dramatic, but is still much higher compared to 
the earlier periods. 
 
Whether or not one considers the amendments in this assessment, the 
trend is clear: Congress is passing fewer bipartisan overrides of major 
legislation (both absolutely and as a percentage of all override legislation), 
and there is a potential for more partisan overrides in the future under the 
right conditions. 
As moderates continue to leave Congress, and as members of both 
Houses become more polarized, the chances of bipartisan overrides 
diminish. Polarized overrides will arise in periods of unified government. 
In addition, Congress will continue to pass technical overrides on occasion 
There is enough legislation passed by even a polarized Congress of a more 
technical nature, and overrides of Supreme Court decisions will likely 
continue on issues of low salience or those pushed by lobbyists. But the 
 
Maltzman & Charles R. Shipan, Change, Continuity, and the Evolution of the Law, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
252 (2008). 
 122. The list of these amendments appears infra Appendix III. Each of these amendments received 
significant coverage in the New York Times. 
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most important overrides of Supreme Court decisions are likely to remain 
fewer in number and supported by one party over the opposition of the 
other in conditions of unified government. 
III.  POLARIZATION AND THE SUPREME COURT NOMINATIONS 
PROCESS 
Overrides of Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions are one 
important way in which Congress interacts with the Supreme Court. 
Another key interaction is the Senate’s role in confirming Supreme Court 
judicial nominees. Aside from overrides and confirmation, Congress has 
little leverage to influence the Supreme Court. Polarization in both the 
Senate and the Supreme Court could complicate the confirmation process 
going forward, potentially changing the nature of the Senate, the Supreme 
Court, or both. 
A.  SUPREME COURT PARTISAN REALIGNMENT 
Part II of this Article described the rise of polarization in the Senate 
and the loss of Senate moderates. Consider now polarization at the 
Supreme Court. 
Ideological polarization at the Supreme Court is nothing new. Each 
term, the Court issues a fair number of decisions on 5-to-4 (“5-4”) votes, 
and many of those decisions are ideological, with liberals siding against 
conservatives.123 Among the issues on which the Court has divided 5-4 
along ideological lines in the last few years are abortion,124 affirmative 
action,125 campaign finance,126 and the treatment of enemy combatants.127 
Over the last twelve years, the Court has issued an average of nineteen 
5-4 decisions each term, with 70 percent of those 5-4 divides representing 
an ideological split and 62 percent of those ideological splits resulting in a 
conservative victory.128 Justice Kennedy has been the most important 
 
 123. The statistics in this section come from Tom Goldstein’s SCOTUSblog StatPack. Stat Pack, 
Final, October Term 2011, SCOTUSBLOG at 14 (June 30, 2012), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/SB_five-to-four_OT11_final.pdf. 
 124. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 125. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). This issue is back before the Court in the October 
2012 term in the case Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, and the result may be to overrule Grutter. 
Adam Liptak, College Diversity Nears Its Last Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2011, at SR4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/sunday-review/college-diversity-nears-its-last-stand.html. 
 126. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 127. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 128. SCOTUSBLOG Stat Pack, supra note 123, at 14. 
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swing voter, as a conservative Justice who sometimes sides with liberals: 
from the October 2006 to October 2010 term, Justice Kennedy has been in 
the majority in 5-4 decisions 80 percent of the time.129 The big surprise in 
the health care ruling was that it was Chief Justice Roberts, and not Justice 
Kennedy, who cast the deciding vote with the liberal Justices in upholding 
the bulk of the health care law. 
While ideological polarization at the Supreme Court is not new, what 
is new is that ideological polarization lines up with a partisan polarization: 
on the current Court, all the conservative Justices have been nominated by 
Republican presidents and all the liberal Justices have been nominated by 
Democratic presidents. President George W. Bush replaced 
conservative/moderate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor with strong 
conservative Justice Samuel Alito. Justices John Paul Stevens and David 
Souter were the last liberal-leaning Republican-appointed Justices to leave 
the Court, replaced by Democratic President Obama with Justices Sonia 
Sotomayor and Elena Kagan. Justice Byron White was the last 
conservative-leaning Democrat-appointed Justice to leave the Court, 
replaced with strong liberal Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg by President 
Clinton.130 Given the extraordinary length of Supreme Court terms, there 
can well be a lag between popular (or congressional) opinion and the 
opinions of Supreme Court Justices. Justices have huge room to maneuver 
and decide cases consistent with their preferences, regardless of current 
public opinion.131 
However, the new alignment of ideology and party poses dangers for 
the Court. Partisan divides may undermine the Court’s legitimacy, as the 
public may be more inclined to view the Court’s decisions—fairly or not—
as partisan decisions made by partisan actors. Public approval of the 
Supreme Court has been declining recently,132 and it is possible (although 
by no means certain) that the decline will continue, undermining the 
 
 129. Id. at 15. 
 130. Supreme Court Nominations, Present–1789, Statistics & Lists, United States Senate, 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). 
 131. See generally Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 
SUP. CT. REV. 103, 139–42 (noting the lag time issue). 
 132. Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44% in Poll, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 7, 2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/us/politics/44-percent-of-
americans-approve-of-supreme-court-in-new-poll.html. For a careful assessment of how the Court’s 
legitimacy has fared in the wake of its controversial decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), see 
James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira & Lester Kenyatta Spence, The Supreme Court and the US 
Presidential Election of 2000: Wounds, Self-Inflicted or Otherwise?, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 535 (2003). 
The question is whether the Court which survived a crisis of legitimacy after the 2000 election would be 
able to survive a new crisis at a time of increased polarization and partisan realignment. 
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Court’s legitimacy. Some observers have speculated that Chief Justice 
Roberts sided with the liberals in the health care case precisely to maintain 
the Court’s legitimacy among elites and the public.133 
In addition to affecting public opinion, party realignment threatens the 
Supreme Court judicial confirmation process, the issue to which I now turn. 
B.  SENATE CONFIRMATIONS IN THE NEW PARTISAN ERA 
Recent attacks on the Supreme Court from the left have accused the 
five conservative, Republican-appointed Justices of deciding cases such as 
Citizens United, which opened up corporate spending in federal elections, 
to benefit Republicans politically.134 The more people think of the Justices 
as dividing on partisan lines and deciding cases the same partisan way in 
which legislators decide on legislative actions (whether or not that is an 
accurate characterization135), the easier it will be for senators to oppose 
judicial nominations on ideological and partisan grounds. 
Despite Chief Justice Roberts’ vote to uphold the health care law, his 
opinion on the scope of the Commerce Clause narrowed congressional 
power and was very similar to the position taken by the four health care 
dissenters and opposed by the four liberal, Democrat-appointed Justices on 
the Court. In coming terms we can expect similar ideological and partisan 
splits on the Court regarding issues such as affirmative action, voting 
rights, and abortion rights, with the Chief Justice proving to be no 
liberal.136 The claim that “Republican Justices” decide controversial 
 
 133. See, e.g., David L. Franklin, Why Did Roberts Do It? To Save the Court, SLATE (Jun. 28, 
2012, 3:51 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/06/john_roberts_broke_with_cons
ervatives_to_preserve_the_supreme_court_s_legitimacy.html. 
 134. Adam Liptak, In Supreme Court Term, Striking Unity on Major Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 30, 
2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/01/us/supreme-courts-recent-term-a-new-
phase.html (“In the wake of the blockbuster Citizens United decision, which by a 5-to-4 vote along 
ideological lines opened the door for corporations and unions to spend as much as they like to support 
or oppose political candidates, the court was accused of naked partisanship for seeming to favor 
Republican interests.”). 
 135. See id. (“But in the last term, the Roberts court proved itself resistant to caricature.”). 
 136. Ronald Dworkin, A Bigger Victory Than We Knew, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, July 13, 2012, 
available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/aug/16/bigger-victory-we-knew/ (“The 
Court will have the opportunity to overrule its 2003 decision allowing state universities to take an 
admission candidate’s race into account, as one factor among others, in seeking a diverse student body. 
The conservative justices might wish to abolish affirmative action altogether, or to impose more 
stringent restrictions on it. They will also have the opportunity to reverse lower courts by upholding the 
Defense of Marriage Act, which forbids federal agencies to treat gay marriages as real, for example by 
allowing a gay couple to file a joint income tax return. The same justices will also be asked to strike 
down an important part of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which requires states with particularly bad 
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constitutional cases in line with Republican values and that “Democratic 
Justices” decide many such cases in line with Democratic values will have 
increasing resonance. 
This partisan realignment comes as senators have become more vocal 
and explicit in opposing Supreme Court nominees on ideological grounds. 
As Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Chad Westerland found:  
While it is true that ideology has always played some role in [Supreme 
Court] judicial appointments, its importance seems to be increasing with 
time. . . . [T]he degree to which candidates share the political values of 
their nominating President is higher now than it was just three decades 
ago. And . . . although Senators of today—no less than those of 
yesterday—attend to the nominees’ qualifications, ideological 
compatibility now takes precedence.137 
Consider the 2005 statement then-Senator Obama made against the 
nomination of John Roberts to be Chief Justice of the United States: 
 There is absolutely no doubt in my mind Judge Roberts is qualified to 
sit on the highest court in the land. Moreover, he seems to have the 
comportment and the temperament that makes for a good judge. He is 
humble, he is personally decent, and he appears to be respectful of 
different points of view. It is absolutely clear to me that Judge Roberts 
truly loves the law. He couldn’t have achieved his excellent record as an 
advocate before the Supreme Court without that passion for the law, and 
it became apparent to me in our conversation that he does, in fact, deeply 
respect the basic precepts that go into deciding 95 percent of the cases 
that come before the Federal court—adherence to precedence, a certain 
modesty in reading statutes and constitutional text, a respect for 
procedural regularity, and an impartiality in presiding over the 
adversarial system. All of these characteristics make me want to vote for 
Judge Roberts. 
 The problem I face—a problem that has been voiced by some of my 
other colleagues, both those who are voting for Mr. Roberts and those 
who are voting against Mr. Roberts—is that while adherence to legal 
precedent and rules of statutory or constitutional construction will 
dispose of 95 percent of the cases that come before a court, so that both a 
 
voting rights records to seek federal permission for new changes in their election laws. No doubt, 
moreover, they will soon find a chance further to constrict or even to abolish abortion rights. Roberts 
may want to blunt the anticipated accusations of political partisanship that any right-wing decisions in 
these cases will likely attract by supporting Obama’s health care program now. If so, he will have been 
immeasurably helped by his new enemies in the right-wing media who are painting him as a secret 
liberal, or as a turncoat villain with a deteriorating mind.”). 
 137. Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Increasing Importance of Ideology in 
the Nomination and Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 609, 610 (2008). 
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Scalia and a Ginsburg will arrive at the same place most of the time on 
those 95 percent of the cases—what matters on the Supreme Court is 
those 5 percent of cases that are truly difficult. In those cases, adherence 
to precedent and rules of construction and interpretation will only get 
you through the 25th mile of the marathon. That last mile can only be 
determined on the basis of one’s deepest values, one’s core concerns, 
one’s broader perspectives on how the world works, and the depth and 
breadth of one’s empathy.138 
The shift to explicit consideration of ideology and away from at least 
an ostensible focus on judicial competence has coincided with increasing 
partisan split on votes for Supreme Court judicial confirmations. Putting 
aside the contentious Bork hearings (to which I will return) and Justice 
Thomas’s confirmation vote, which occurred after a highly contentious 
hearing in which he was accused of sexual harassment,139 Supreme Court 
nominees until recently140 enjoyed bipartisan support in confirmation votes. 
Justices Scalia and Kennedy were approved on unanimous votes,141 and 
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg had few votes against them.142 
More recent votes have seen much more substantial opposition to 
nominees along party lines. Chief Justice Roberts had twenty-two votes 
cast against him, all by Democrats and without any objections raised to his 
qualifications.143 Justice Alito had forty-two votes cast against him (two 
more than necessary for a filibuster, had Democrats decided to filibuster), 
gaining “yes” votes from only four Democrats.144 Justice Sotomayor had 
 
 138. 151 CONG. REC. S10365–66 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2005) (statement of Sen. Barack Obama), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2005-09-22/pdf/CREC-2005-09-22-pt1-
PgS10365.pdf. 
 139. Nancy Gibbs, Hill vs. Thomas: An Ugly Circus, TIME MAGAZINE, Oct. 21, 1991, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,974074,00.html. 
 140. Senate rejections of Supreme Court nominees have fluctuated over time. The Senate rejected 
three nominees besides Bork in the twentieth century, and Justice Fortas withdrew his nomination to be 
Chief Justice after a filibuster. Supreme Court Nominations, Present–1789, supra note 130. 
Nonetheless, the vast majority of Supreme Court nominees in the last century were confirmed. In the 
twenty-first century, so far only one nominee, Harriet Miers, withdrew her nomination. None have been 
filibustered. Id. 
 141. Justice Scalia was approved on a 98-0 vote and Kennedy on a 97-0 vote. Id. Justice Thomas’s 
vote was 52 to 48, but the nomination became embroiled in controversy over sexual harassment 
allegations. See Gibbs, supra note 139. 
 142. Justice Ginsburg was approved on a 96-3 vote, and Breyer, 87-9. Supreme Court 
Nominations, Present–1789, supra note 130. 
 143. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 109th Congress—1st Session, Legislation & Records, United 
State Senate, 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=1
&vote=00245 (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
 144. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 109th Congress—2nd Session, Legislation & Records, United 
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thirty-one votes cast against her, garnering the support of nine 
Republicans.145 The most recent nominee, Justice Kagan, had thirty-seven 
votes cast against her, gaining only five Republican votes.146 Opposing 
senators did not raise any serious questions about the qualifications of any 
of these nominees. 
Notably, three of the four Democrats voting for Justice Alito (Senators 
Kent Conrad, Ben Nelson, and Robert Byrd) left the Senate, and three of 
the five Republicans voting for Justice Kagan (Senators Judd Gregg, 
Richard Lugar, and Olympia Snowe) also recently left the Senate. Each of 
these senators was known as a moderate. Figure 14 shows the number of 
“no” votes received by each current member of the Supreme Court during 
the nomination process.147 
 
The big question is whether the increasing partisan opposition to 
Supreme Court nominees on ideological grounds will lead senators to begin 
to consider filibustering Supreme Court nominees from the other party. The 
 
State Senate, 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=109&session=2
&vote=00002 (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
 145. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress—1st Session, Legislation & Records, United 
State Senate, 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=1
&vote=00262 (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
 146. U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes 111th Congress—2nd Session, Legislation & Records, United 
State Senate, 
http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=111&session=2
&vote=00229 (last visited Jan. 5, 2013). 
 147. Supreme Court Nominations, Present–1789, supra note 130.  
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issue could come to a head when Justice Kennedy, the perennial “swing” 
Justice, leaves the Court.148 
In recent years, both Democratic senators and Republican senators 
have filibustered, stalled, or put holds on lower court nominees, especially 
nominees to the federal appellate courts. Senators are especially interested 
in filibustering young appellate court judges, such as Republican Miguel 
Estrada (filibustered by Democrats) or Democrat Goodwin Liu (filibustered 
by Republicans), who appear on track for a Supreme Court nomination and 
who would benefit from having judicial experience on the resume.149 
The trend to fight over lower court nominees has only accelerated 
during the Obama administration.150 Increasingly, partisans on both sides 
(when their party was in the Senate majority) have called for the majority 
to use the so-called “nuclear option”: a parliamentary move in which a bare 
Senate majority would eliminate the filibuster for judicial nominees.151 
It is hard to know how the much the battle over lower court judicial 
nominations would resemble a battle over a Kennedy replacement. Lower 
court nominations are of much lower salience than Supreme Court 
nominations, especially a nomination to replace a swing Justice on a 
sharply divided partisan court. When the moment comes for a new 
nomination, interest groups will mobilize, social media will buzz, and 
political partisans from all sides will put intense pressure on senators from 
the opposition party to filibuster any nominee who would be a strong 
conservative or liberal on the Court. Some will defend the filibuster as a 
means of insuring the placement of ideological moderates on the Court.152 
 
 148. On Justice Kennedy’s importance as a “super median” Justice, see Lee Epstein & Tonja 
Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37 (2008). 
 149. John Steele Gordon, A Filibuster That Goes Around Comes Around, COMMENTARY (May 20, 
2011, 1:55 PM), http://www.commentarymagazine.com/2011/05/20/filibuster-that-goes-around-comes-
around/; Meredith Shiner, Senate GOP Filibusters Goodwin Liu, POLITICO (May 19, 2011, 2:41 PM), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0511/55320.html.  
 150. For histories and analyses of this period, see Michael Gerhardt & Richard Painter, 
“Extraordinary Circumstances”: The Legacy of the Gang of 14 and a Proposal for Judicial 
Nominations Reform, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 969 (2012); Carl Tobias, Filling the Judicial Vacancies in a 
Presidential Election Year, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 985 (2012); Carl W. Tobias, Postpartisan Federal 
Judicial Selection, 51 B.C. L. REV. 769 (2010). 
 151. For an explanation of how the “nuclear option” would work, see Gerhardt & Painter, supra 
note 150, at 974–76. On the modern filibuster as “one of the central features of American politics,” see 
McCarty, The Policy Effects of Political Polarization, supra note 101, at 236. 
 152. See William A. Galston, Political Polarization and the U.S. Judiciary, 77 UMKC L. REV. 
307, 323 (2008) (“In the meantime . . . de facto governance by supermajorities in the Senate should 
continue. We simply see no other means of restraining the possibility that now, by the slimmest of 
margins, presidents may imbed fellow partisans on the Supreme Court for spans of a quarter-century or 
more.”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Judicial Filibuster, the Median Senator, and 
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But in the past, senators have not been willing to pull the trigger even when 
it came to controversial nominations such as Justice Thomas’s and where 
there were more than enough votes to filibuster. 
The hardening of partisan positions in the Senate and the lack of 
Senate moderates increases the chances that a stalemate over a Supreme 
Court judicial nominee could lead to a standoff over the use of the 
filibuster. In this way, a coming dispute differs markedly from the fight 
over the Bork nomination. While some attribute the current tensions over 
judicial nominees to the Bork fight,153 the Senate in the years following the 
fight managed to overcome that division, easily confirming four of the next 
five Supreme Court nominees (two Democrats and two Republicans) 
unanimously or by lopsided majorities. But the four most recent nominees 
now sitting (in the years furthest from the Bork hearings)—all eminently 
well-qualified jurists—have been confirmed on sharply divided votes, with 
substantial numbers of senators from the opposing party voting against the 
nominee. Something seems to have changed fundamentally in the Senate. 
C.  POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS OF A SENATE SHOWDOWN 
If the partisan Senate has an extended confrontation over a Supreme 
Court judicial nominee, the confrontation might end in a number of ways. 
The nominating president might withdraw a nomination, and nominate a 
replacement candidate seen as more moderate by the minority threatening a 
filibuster.154 Alternatively, the President and Senate majority might hold 
firm on the original nominee, and trigger the nuclear option, removing the 
possibility of filibustering Supreme Court (or all federal) judicial nominees. 
Senators alternatively might conclude that triggering the nuclear option 
could have potentially negative consequences for the Senate’s conduct of 
business. They could strike a more radical compromise on Supreme Court 
judicial nominations. For example, senators might limit judicial terms to 
eighteen years, which would lower the costs of confirming an ideological 
Justice to the Court and insure more turnover on the Court.155 
 
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 257, 258 (Senate filibuster “will tend to make 
Justices more moderate, where moderate means having a jurisprudential view closer to the view held by 
the median Senator.”). 
 153. See Lee Epstein et al., The Changing Dynamics of Senate Voting on Supreme Court 
Nominees, 68 J. POL. 296 (2006). For a skeptical view of the importance of the Bork controversy on 
more recent judicial nomination battles, see SARAH A. BINDER & FORREST MALTZMAN, ADVICE & 
DISSENT: THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7–9 (2009). 
 154. I assume that if the President and Senate majority are of opposite parties, the President will 
be more likely to nominate a moderate nominee marginally acceptable to the Senate majority. 
 155. For a review and critique of the various term limits proposals, see Mary L. Clark, Judicial 
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The second of these options could change the nature of the Senate 
greatly. A move away from the filibuster would turn the Senate into a more 
majoritarian institution,156 and, in making the Senate more like the House, 
it could further exacerbate partisan tensions. Ending the filibuster only as to 
judicial nominees would strengthen the Senate compared to the Court, by 
allowing greater control over the Court’s composition. Ending the filibuster 
more broadly could give political parties in times of united government 
(where a single party controls House, Senate, and Presidency) an 
unprecedented opportunity to enact and change major public policies, 
subject only to control by an ideologically divided Supreme Court. 
Alternatively, Supreme Court term limits could change the nature of 
the Court. By lowering the stakes, term limits should make ideological 
judges easier to confirm. However, term limits might further solidify the 
ideological nature of Supreme Court judging by providing a path for 
presidents to nominate more ideological Justices. More speculatively, term 
limits create a risk that Justices will judge keeping their future career 
prospects in mind, especially as a judicial term comes to an end.157 Both of 
these paths suggest dangers to the long term legitimacy of the Court, as the 
public and elites may tend to see Justices as both ideological and self-
interested. 
All of this analysis in Part III is undoubtedly speculative. Perhaps the 
correlation of ideology and party in the Supreme Court will not matter to 
the increasingly partisan Senate, and the Court’s legitimacy will remain 
stable. The Senate confirmation process may chug along as always. But the 
loss of Senate moderates makes it more likely than in the past that a 
Supreme Court nomination could explode into a major political crisis. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Political polarization is changing power relationships between 
Congress and the Supreme Court, in some ways which are evident, such as 
 
Retirement and Return to Practice, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 841 (2011). Some of the proposals would 
require constitutional amendment, and the precise nature of the proposals is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
 156. It would only be internally majoritarian. Because each state gets two senators regardless of 
population, and some states have vastly larger populations than others, some filibusters actually could 
promote (voter) majority rule. See generally FRANCES E. LEE & BRUCE I. OPPENHEIMER, SIZING UP 
THE SENATE: THE UNEQUAL CONSEQUENCES OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION (1999) (examining the 
effects of Senate apportionment on political outcomes and realities). 
 157. See Clark, supra note 155, at 904 (arguing against the ability of retiring Article III judges to 
return to private practice following a term as a judge because of “the real and apparent threats to 
judicial independence, impartiality, and integrity presented” by return). 
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through a more ideological Supreme Court confirmation process, and in 
some ways which have been mostly hidden, such as through the dramatic 
decline in congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory 
interpretation case law. 
As Congress becomes ever more partisan and its moderates are forced 
out or retire, and as Supreme Court Justices become associated increasingly 
with the views of the President and party who appointed them, the 
Congress-Supreme Court relationship is likely to change further. 
Congressional overrides likely will occur infrequently, but more often on a 
partisan basis in periods of unified government. Otherwise, the Court is 
more likely to have the last word on federal statutory meaning. 
In the longer term, the task of replacing a swing Supreme Court 
Justice could lead to an unprecedented confrontation in the Senate, with the 
potential to change the nature of the Senate, the Supreme Court, or both 
bodies. As the institutions respond to the pressures of polarization, power 
relationships will continue to shift. 
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APPENDIX I. 
 CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDES OF SUPREME COURT STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION CASES, 1991–2012 
YEAR CONGRESSIONAL ACT SUPREME COURT CASE 
OVERRULED 
2011 America Invents Act of 2011 Holmes Grp, Inc. v. Vornado Air 
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 
826 (2002) 
2011 Federal Courts Jurisdiction and 
Venue Act of 2011 
Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 
(1960) 
2009 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery 
Act of 2009 
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 
507 (2008) 
  Allison Engine Co., Inc. v. 
United States ex rel. Sanders, 
553 U.S. 662 (2008) 
2009 Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act of 2009 
FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 
(2000) 
2009 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 
2009 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) 
2008 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 
527 U.S. 471 (1999) 
  Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, 
Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 
(2002) 
2007 Open Government Act of 2007 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 
Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598 
(2001) 
2006 Trademark Dilution Revision Act 
of 2006  
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 
Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) 
2006 Military Commission Act of 2006 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557 (2006) 
2006 Voting Rights Act Amendments 
of 2006 
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 
461 (2003) 
  Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 
528 U.S. 320 (2000) 
2005 Emergency Supplemental INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 
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Appropriations Act for Defense, 
the Global War on Terror, and 
Tsunami Relief 
(2001) 
2005 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 
(2004) 
2005 Class Action Fairness Act of 
2005 
United Steelworkers of America, 
AFL-CIO v. R. H. Bouligny, 
Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965) 
2002 The Job Creation and Worker 
Assistance Act of 2002 
Gitlitz v. Commissioner, 531 
U.S. 206 (2001) 
1999 Financial Services Modernization 
Act of 1999 (Graham-Leach-
Bliley) 
Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., 
N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 
(1996) 
1996 Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996 
Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 
(1995) 
1996 False Statements Accountability 
Act of 1996 
Hubbard v. United States, 514 
U.S. 695 (1995) 
1996 Federal Courts Improvement Act 
of 1996 
Int’l Primate Prot. League v. 
Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 
500 U.S. 72 (1991) 
  Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 
(1984) 
1995 Reversal of Adams Fruit Co. v. 
Barrett 
Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 
U.S. 638 (1990) 
1995 ICC Termination Act of 1995 Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. 
Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 
175 (1995) 
1995 Reconciliation of Budget of 1996 Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 
(1994) 
1995 Paperwork Reduction Act of 
1995 
Dole v. United Steelworkers of 
America, 494 U.S. 26 (1990) 
1994 Money Laundering and 
Suppression Act of 1994 
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 
U.S. 135 (1994) 
1994 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep’t of 
Income Maint., 492 U.S. 96 
(1989) 
  United States v. Nordic Village, 
Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992) 
  Rake v. Wade, 508 US 464 
(1993) 
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1993 Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act of 1993 
United States v. Nordic Village, 
Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992) 
1993 Negotiated Rates Act of 1993 Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. 
Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116 
(1990) 
1992 Federal Facility Compliance Act 
of 1992 
United States Dep’t of Energy v. 
Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992) 
1991 Criminal Jurisdiction Over 
Indians Act of 1991 
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 
(1990) 
1991 Incarcerated Witness Fee Act of 
1991 
Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 
U.S. 184 (1991) 
1991 FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 
350 (1991) 
1991 Civil Rights Act of 1991 Patterson v. McLean Credit 
Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) 
  Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) 
  Lorance v. AT&T Techs., 490 
U.S. 900 (1989) 
  Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 
U.S. 310 (1986) 
  Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 
(1985) 
  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228 (1989) 
  Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. 
Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 
(1987) 
  Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 
(1986) 
  Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 
(1989) 
  Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants 
v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754 (1989) 
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APPENDIX II. 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDES OF SUPREME COURT STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION CASES, 1967–2010, ALSO APPEARING ON MAYHEW’S 
LIST OF “MAJOR LEGISLATION” 
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 
Military Commission Act of 2006 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 
Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
Civil Rights Act of 1991 
Immigration Act of 1990 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 
Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 
Copyrights Act (1976) 
Tax Reform Act of 1976 
Voting Rights Act Extension (1975) 
Magnuson-Moss Warranty FTC Improvements Act (1974) 
Freedom of Information Act (1974) 
Fair Labor Standards Amendment of 1974 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (1973) 
Equal Employment Opportunity Amendment of 1972 
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 
HASE7 1/25/2013  12:30 PM 
2012] POLITICAL POLARIZATION 153 
APPENDIX III. 
SIGNIFICANT CONGRESSIONAL OVERRIDES OF SUPREME COURT 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION CASES THROUGH AMENDMENTS, 1967–
2010, NOT APPEARING ON MAYHEW’S LIST OF “MAJOR LEGISLATION” 
Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments of 2008 
Voting Rights Act Amendments of 2006 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978 
Longshoreman’s & Harbor Workers Compensation Act Amendments of 1972 
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APPENDIX IV. 
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX 
Identifying congressional overrides is a challenge, as there is no single 
repository of such information. It turns out to be an increasingly difficult 
challenge, as committee reports appear less likely than twenty years ago 
(the end of Eskridge’s study) to explicitly note a congressional override. 
Thus, while Eskridge wrote that he did not count as overrides “statutes for 
which the legislative history—mainly committee reports and hearings—
does not reveal a legislative focus on judicial decisions,”158 it appears 
necessary to count some overrides of statutes where there is no committee 
report showing a legislative focus on Supreme Court decisions. On the 
other hand if, thanks to new technology, I am able to delve more deeply 
into the legislative weeds than Eskridge was able to do in 1990, then I may 
lose the apples-to-apples comparison with his data that I am hoping for. 
I began my search using Westlaw, searching House and Senate 
committee reports from 1991 to the present for indications that a successful 
piece of federal legislation overturned, reversed, or modified a Supreme 
Court statutory interpretation holding. Like Eskridge, I did not count 
congressional bills which simply “codified” or “clarified” Supreme Court 
cases, and I did not count bills which implicitly overruled a Supreme Court 
statutory interpretation decision.159 
When I shared an earlier draft of this Article with other scholars, some 
scholars suggested additional possible overrides to me which did not come 
up on my initial searches. I then refined my Westlaw search to capture 
these additional overrides. I used the following search in the USCCAN-
REP Westlaw database: (OVERRUL! MODIF! CORRECT! CLARIF! 
REVERS! REJECT! DISAGREE! ERRONEOUS! MISINTERPRET! 
OVERTURN! RESTOR!) /10 “SUPREME COURT” & date(aft 1990). It 
captured almost all of the cases I and others had identified.160 As a backup, 
 
 158. Eskridge, supra note 29, at 332 n.1. Another problem is that Congress has no uniform 
method of expressing its intention to override a statute. The language used in reports can vary wildly, 
and even direct overrides often involve vague or oblique language. This makes it difficult to predict 
exactly how Congress might express itself in any given instance, and occasionally gives rise to 
considerable ambiguity as to whether a statute truly qualifies as an override. 
 159. Like Eskridge, Barnes excluded implicit overrides “on practical grounds; such overrides are 
extremely difficult—if not impossible—to identify systematically.” BARNES, supra note 44, at 23. 
 160. Ironically, this search did not find a 1995 law entitled “Reversal of Adams Fruit Co. v. 
Barrett.” 
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my research assistant or I examined every mention of “Supreme Court” in 
this database from January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2012, and it 
yielded a single additional case beyond the more restrictive search. I also 
compared my results with Hausegger and Baum’s 1991–96 results.161 
I also searched the Westlaw “JLR” (Journals and Law Review) 
database for law review articles from 1990 forward mentioning potential 
congressional overrides of federal statutes. This JLR search yielded a 
handful of additional cases. Finally, I was able to get a copy of Hausegger 
and Baum’s list of overrides from 1991–1996 and cross-referencing this list 
yielded a few additional overrides. 
I believe that these research methods have revealed most major 
overrides of Supreme Court statutory interpretation cases since 1991. 
However, despite these efforts, there is no doubt that I have missed some, 
probably minor, overrides. For example, none of the legislative materials 
on Westlaw indicate that the Anti-Terrorism and Effect Death Penalty Act 
of 2006 overruled any Supreme Court cases. But upon hearing that 
Congress passed the law with that intent, I asked UCI librarians to search 
additional sources for express evidence of a congressional intent to 
override. The librarians located a report, not available on Westlaw, which 
confirms the intent to override.162 There may be other isolated overrides 
neither mentioned in committee reports available on Westlaw nor noted in 
journals or law reviews. 
I have also erred on the side of including, rather than excluding, 
questionable laws as overrides. For example, a House report on the 2009 
law giving the FDA authority to regulate tobacco as a drug describes the 
Supreme Court as having concluded in a 2000 case that Congress did not 
intend to give the FDA such authority. The report describes Congress in 
2009 as giving the FDA such authority at this point going forward—
thereby modifying the law going forward, as opposed to reversing the 
Court’s prior interpretation.163 I nonetheless coded this law as an override. 
 
 161. Hausegger & Baum, supra note 44. 
 162. Federal Habeas Corpus Reform: Eliminating Prisoners’ Abuse of the Judicial Process: 
Hearing on S. 623 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 90 (1995) (“Each of the current 
bills would apparently overrule the recent Supreme Court case of Schlup v. Delo, 115 S.Ct. 851 (1995) 
by setting a higher burden of proof for newly discovered evidence of actual innocence.”). 
 163. H.R. REP. NO. 111-706, at 127 (2011) (“A resulting Supreme Court decision in 2000, while 
acknowledging that tobacco use posed ‘perhaps the single most significant threat to public health in the 
United States,’ found that Congress had not given FDA authority over tobacco products as part of the 
FFDCA. The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act amends the FFDCA to grant FDA 
the authority to regulate tobacco products.”). 
